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Chair and Members
Delta Stewardship Council
980 Ninth Street; Suite 1500
Sacramento, CA 95814

Re: Appeal of California WaterFix Consistency Certification –
Water Code, § 85225.10 -
23 CCR § 5002(a)

Delta Stewardship Council:

This appeal of the State of California DWR's certification of consistency for the California WaterFix (CWF or "the Project") is submitted on behalf of the County of Sacramento ("the County") and the Sacramento County Water Agency (SCWA). The Project proposes the construction and operation of substantial industrial water supply infrastructure within the Sacramento County portion of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. This massive undertaking poses unacceptable impacts for both Sacramento County and the broader Delta region. The Project conflicts with the Delta Reform Act and the Delta Plan including, but not limited to, policies and goals enacted to protect the ecology, culture, economy, agriculture and natural resources of the Delta. (See, e.g., Water Code, §§ 85020, 85301, subd. (a).) One devastating example of this is the acknowledged permanent conversion of 3,909 acres of Important Farmland. (FEIR, p. 14-111.)

The Project would also defeat the policies of the Delta Reform Act and Delta Plan by increasing, rather than reducing, reliance upon the Delta for water exports. (See Water Code, § 85021.) Ostensibly devised as a solution for the environmental problems caused by operation of the Jones and Banks pumps near Tracy, the Project would reaffirm and potentially expand State Water Project (SWP) and Central Valley Project (CVP) reliance upon Delta water, while nevertheless *continuing* to use the Jones and Banks pumps as part of a through-Delta "dual conveyance" operation. (FEIR, pp. 3-90, 3-92.) The Project simply magnifies the challenges and drawbacks of Statewide

dependence on Delta water.

DWR's California WaterFix must be consistent with the Delta Plan. (See Water Code, § 85022, subd. (a).) Further, DWR must certify how the Project is consistent with specified regulatory policies. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 5002, subd. (a).) For all of the reasons stated herein, DWR has failed to demonstrate in its Certification of Consistency (filed 7/27/2018) how the Project is consistent with the Delta Plan, how it meets the regulatory policies and how it furthers the coequal goals of the Delta Reform Act. (See Water Code, §§ 85020, 85054.)

The "coequal goals" of the Delta Reform Act refers to "the two goals of providing a more reliable water supply for California and protecting, restoring, and enhancing the Delta ecosystem." (Water Code, § 85054.) These goals must be achieved "in a manner that protects and enhances the unique, cultural, recreational, natural resource, and agricultural values of the Delta as an evolving place." (*Ibid.*) Thus, although the Delta Reform Act may call for efforts - and even infrastructure - to improve water supply reliability, it must not be done at the expense of the existing and "evolving" Delta culture and environment.

As discussed below and in the County's supporting materials¹, the Project is inconsistent with the Delta Plan and, as a result of that inconsistency, the Project will have a significant adverse impact on the achievement of one or both of the coequal goals. (See Water Code, § 85225.10.) DWR's Certification of Consistency is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See Water Code, § 85225.25.)

THE PROJECT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH DELTA PLAN POLICIES AND THE REGULATORY POLICIES OF THE DSC.

The Project Fails to Document Use of the Best Available Science.
(Delta Plan Policy G P1(b)(3); 23 CCR § 5002(b)(3))

Delta Plan Policy G PI, (Detailed Findings to Establish Consistency with the Delta Plan) requires that all covered actions "document use of best available science." (2013 Delta Plan, p. 53.) The 2015 ISB Report, along with the ISB's May 2014 review of the DEIR/DEIS are highly critical of the data and methodologies supporting the Project and its environmental studies. The ISB's detailed comments lament the RDEIR/SDEIS's "missing content," including key information about adaptive management and collaborative science, how levee failures would affect operation of dual conveyance systems, the effect of climate

¹ This Appeal includes supporting written factual testimony that will be filed along with the appeal. In addition, pursuant to Section 11 of the DSC Administrative Procedures Governing Appeals, the County anticipates submitting additional written factual testimony subsequent to the appeal deadline, but no later than 10 days before the appeal hearing.

change on expected water exports from the Delta and system operations, and effects of changes in operations of the State Water Project and Central Valley Project or other changes in water availability, on agricultural practices in the San Joaquin Valley. (See 2015 ISB Report, at p. 4 et seq.) The 2015 ISB Report is substantial evidence of the DWR's failure to document the use of best available science. Additionally, the expert reports of MBK Engineers, Dave Vogel, Robert Latour and others who commented on the DEIR/DEIS and/or the RDEIR/RDEIS provide additional substantial evidence to demonstrate that the Project and its environmental review documents do not document the use of best available science. In this critical respect the CalWaterFix and its EIR/EIS are inconsistent with both the language and intent of the Delta Reform Act and Delta Plan.

The Project Fails to Properly Define Adaptive Management.
(Delta Plan Policy G P1(b)(4); 23 CCR § 5002(b)(4))

Delta Plan Policy G P1 requires that water management covered actions include adequate provisions appropriate to the scope of the covered action, to assure continued implementation of adaptive management. This requirement shall be satisfied through both of the following: (A) An adaptive management plan that describes the approach to be taken consistent with the adaptive management framework in Appendix 1B; and (B) Documentation of access to adequate resources and delineated authority by the entity responsible for the implementation of the proposed adaptive management process. (2013 Delta Plan, p. 53.)

An essential element of an adequate adaptive management process as defined in Appendix 1B of the Delta Plan is the establishment of concrete performance measures against which impacts and mitigation, and the success of the adaptive management process itself, can be measured. (See, e.g., Appendix 1B, pp. 1B-3-1B4.) The Project FEIR relies heavily on vague and undefined "adaptive management" processes to quantify and mitigate the Project's many significant environmental impacts. The lack of specified thresholds for action was criticized by the SWRCB in its July 29, 2014, comments on the BDCP and DEIR/DEIS², and this error has not been corrected.

The ISB was highly critical of the RDEIR/SDEIS's treatment of adaptive management. (See 2015 ISB Report at pp. 5-6.) The ISB was unable to "find examples of how adaptive management would be applied to assessing - and finding ways to reduce - the environmental impacts of project construction and operations." (*Id.* at p. 5.) The ISB found the project proponents' continued deferral of development of information about adaptive management to project

² See July 29, 2014, letter to Ryan Wulff by Diane Riddle, Environmental Program Manager, SWRCB re. Comments on BDCP, Draft BDCP EIR/EIS and BDCP Implementing Agreement.

construction and operations to be inexcusable. Specifically, the ISB opined that "if adaptive management and monitoring are central to California WaterFix, then details of how they will be done and resourced should be developed at the outset (now) so they can be better reviewed, improved and integrated into related Delta activities." (*Id.* at p. 5.) The ISB concluded:

The protracted development of the BDCP and its successors has provided ample time for an adaptive management plan to be fleshed out. The [RDEIR/SDEIS] does little more than promise that collaborations will occur and that adaptive management will be implemented. This level of assurance contrasts with the central role of adaptive management in the Delta Plan and with the need to manage adaptively as climate continues to change and new contingencies arise.

(*Id.* at p. 6.)

The County further submits written testimony by Thomas Stokely, filed herewith, elaborating on the deficiencies of the Project's adaptive management program.

The Project's lack of a scientifically and legally adequate adaptive management process is inconsistent with Delta Plan Policy GP 1.

The Project Increases, Rather Than Reduces, Reliance on the Delta as a Water Source.

(Delta Plan Policy WR P1; 23 CCR § 5003)

Delta Plan Policy WR P1 states the following:

"Water shall not be exported from, transferred through, or used in the Delta if all of the following apply:

(1) One or more water suppliers that would receive water as a result of the export, transfer, or use have failed to adequately contribute to reduced reliance on the Delta and improved regional self-reliance consistent with all of the requirements listed in paragraph (1) of subsection (c);

(2) That failure has significantly caused the need for the export, transfer, or use; and

(3) The export, transfer, or use would have a significant adverse environmental impact in the Delta."

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 5003, subd. (a).)

In order to satisfy item 5003(a)(1) of this Policy, DWR would need to show that every south-of-Delta SWP and CVP exporter has done each of the following:

“(A) Completed a current Urban or Agricultural Water Management Plan (Plan) which has been reviewed by the California Department of Water Resources for compliance with the applicable requirements of Water Code Division 6, Parts 2.55, 2.6, and 2.8;

(B) Identified, evaluated, and commenced implementation, consistent with the implementation schedule set forth in the Plan, of all programs and projects included in the Plan that are locally cost effective and technically feasible which reduce reliance on the Delta; and

(C) Included in the Plan, commencing in 2015, the expected outcome for measurable reduction in Delta reliance and improvement in regional self-reliance. The expected outcome for measurable reduction in Delta reliance and improvement in regional self-reliance shall be reported in the Plan as the reduction in the amount of water used, or in the percentage of water used, from the Delta watershed. For the purposes of reporting, water efficiency is considered a new source of water supply, consistent with Water Code section 1011(a).”

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 5003, subds. (a) & (c).)

DWR has not made the showing required in item 5003(a)(1). (See DWR Certification of Consistency, at p. 6.) In fact, DWR’s consistency finding for WR P1 does not directly address the three self-reliance criteria set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 5003. Instead, DWR offers – “to the extent feasible” - a part-quantitative, part-qualitative exporter self-reliance assessment that does not meet the specific, express requirements of Section 5003(c).

The collective failure of regional self-reliance has significantly caused the need for the Project or, more specifically, a project of this size. A water export project of this magnitude is necessary precisely because the exporters have not sufficiently contributed to reduced reliance on the Delta. Whatever self-reliance efforts have been made have been insufficient to negate or reduce the scale of the proposed Project.

DWR attempts to explain away the “need” element (§ 5003(a)(2)) by reasoning that the need for the WaterFix “predates” and “exists independently” of this Delta Plan policy. (DWR Cert. of Consistency, p. 6.) To accept this argument is to accept the position that the WaterFix is not subject to the Delta Plan’s concerns regarding over-reliance on the Delta. There is nothing in the Delta Plan

to suggest that is the case. Even if the Delta Plan recognizes a need for new conveyance infrastructure, that infrastructure must be subject to a consideration of the extent to which it is made necessary by lack of regional self-reliance. Proper consideration of such dependence on the Delta will inform the scale and appropriateness of such a project.

By way of the Project Final EIR's analysis of Alternative 4A, DWR effectively concedes that the "export, transfer, or use would have a significant adverse environmental impact in the Delta." (See, e.g., FEIR, pp. ES-60, ES-62, ES-66, ES-67, ES-117, ES-118, ES-119, ES-120, ES-125, ES-126, ES-128, ES-129, ES-130, ES-132, ES-142, ES-143, ES-144, ES-146 and ES-147.) These various significant and unavoidable impacts occur, for instance, with respect to groundwater depletion, water quality (mercury concentrations), loss of topsoil, land use (new physical structures adjacent to existing communities), permanent conversion of Important Farmland, reduction of recreation opportunities, permanent visual impacts to scenic vistas/resources, effects on archaeological and historic sites, traffic (level-of-service), air quality (GHG and regional criteria pollutants), and construction noise.

DWR misstates the "significant adverse impact" criteria of Policy WR P1 (§ 5003(a)(3)). DWR's Certification states "there is no significant change in amount of water exported that could cause a significant adverse environmental impact in the Delta." (DWR. Cert. of Consistency, p. 6.) That is not the requirement. The issue is simply whether "the export, transfer, or use would have a significant adverse environmental impact in the Delta." The FEIR (and pending Supplemental EIR) make clear that it will.

DWR relies on a self-serving interpretation of "water export" to make the case that Policy WR P1 is not applicable to the Project because the Project does not expand any existing water rights. (DWR Certification of Consistency, p. 5.) Such an interpretation would have the absurd and ironic result of ignoring the goal of reduced Delta reliance in the context of the largest Delta export conveyance project in decades. The occasion of the WaterFix approval is the ideal time to apply this Policy and consider whether the self-reliance efforts of SWP and CVP exporters have been sufficient to justify a project of this scope.

The Project Fails to Respect Local Land Use.
(Delta Plan Policy DP P2; 23 CCR § 5011)

Delta Plan Policy DP P2 (Respect Local Land Use When Siting Water or Flood Facilities or Restoring Habitat) requires that water management facilities respect local land use and be sited to avoid or reduce conflicts with existing uses or those uses described or depicted in city and county general plans. (2013 Delta Plan, p. 194.) The proposed diversion facilities and associated infrastructure fail

to respect local land use and will conflict with and irreparably damage the existing Delta communities of Hood, Clarksburg and Courtland by permanently altering the physical landscape, including agricultural and cultural/historic uses, substantially degrading its unique, secure qualities and cultural/historical and economic values in perpetuity. For instance, construction of the three proposed intakes in Sacramento County will permanently convert 270 acres of agricultural land. (See FEIR, p. 3-91.)

The Project would also conflict with established and planned park and recreational areas in the Delta, including Stone Lakes National Wildlife Refuge and the Cosumnes River Preserve. The Project would site permanent tunnel access shafts (two on Staten Island) and permanent "Reusable Tunnel Material areas" (RTM's) upon and adjacent to these recreational areas. DWR states that it "has decreased and/or moved project facility footprints to reduce impacts to existing uses and the environment". (DWR Cert. of Consistency, p. 9.) However, as recently as the release of its still-pending Supplemental EIR, DWR has proposed changes that would substantially increase the acreage of the northern shaft site on Staten Island (part of the Cosumnes River Preserve) and consolidate various RTM locations at a site immediately adjacent to the Cosumnes River Preserve. The Draft SEIR acknowledges that the total area of RTM sites will increase by 171 acres. (See Draft SEIR, p. ES-6.)

The County offers the written testimony of County Supervisor Don Nottoli, Professor Robert Benedetti, County Agricultural Commissioner Julie Jensen, Virginia Henley Chhabra, Chrisandra Flores, Jeff Leatherman and Amber Veselka, filed herewith, as evidence of the Project's conflicts with the County's established and planned land uses. The County also expects to subsequently file, pursuant to DSC Administrative Procedure section 11, excerpts of the County General Plan Land Use and Agricultural Elements to show how and where the Project is inconsistent with the County General Plan.

For these reasons and the reasons set forth in the accompanying written testimony, the Project is fundamentally inconsistent with Delta Plan Policy DP P2.

The Project Fails to Protect Beneficial Uses of Water.
(Delta Plan Recommendation WQ R1)

Delta Plan Policy WQ RI, Protect Beneficial Uses, provides that water quality in the Delta be "maintained at a level that supports, enhances and protects beneficial uses identified in the applicable State Water Resources Control Board or regional water quality control board water quality control plans." (2013 Delta Plan, p. 230.) The Project will have significant adverse effects to Delta water quality, including salinity, that threaten beneficial uses identified in

the applicable water quality control plans, including agricultural irrigation water, fisheries and drinking water for Delta communities. For instance, increases in mercury levels in Delta water will occur that pose health risks to fish, wildlife, and humans. (See FEIR, p. 8-949.) By degrading Delta water quality to levels that threaten existing beneficial uses, the Project is inconsistent with Delta Plan Policy WQ R1.

The County will file, pursuant to DSC Administrative Procedures, Section 11, the written testimony of Ben Bray and Forrest Williams relating to the Project's impacts on water quality; specifically, how the Project will cause reverse flows moving upstream from the Sacramento Regional County Sanitation District facility, which would require shut down of the SCWA Freeport water intake facility.

THE PROJECT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COEQUAL GOALS OF THE DELTA PLAN.

23 CCR § 5002(b)(1)

When a covered action cannot show full consistency, “the agency that files the certification of consistency may nevertheless determine that the covered action is consistent with the Delta Plan because, on whole, that action is consistent with the coequal goals.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 5002, subd. (b)(1).) In its Certification of Consistency, DWR attempts to make such a showing generally and in the context of Delta Plan Policy WR P1 (Reduce Reliance on the Delta). (See DWR Cert. of Consistency, pp. 2, 6-7.) As discussed above, there are several areas where the Project is not consistent with the Delta Plan. DWR, however, cannot rely upon this regulatory savings clause because the Project is inconsistent with the coequal goals.

Providing a More Reliable Water Supply Via Cal WaterFix Cannot Be Achieved In a Manner that Protects and Enhances the Unique Cultural, Recreational, Natural Resource, and Agricultural Values of the Delta as an Evolving Place.

Even if the Project is accepted as one that will provide a more reliable water supply for California, it cannot be constructed, implemented and operated “in a manner that protects and enhances the unique cultural, recreational, natural resource, and agricultural values of the delta as an evolving place.” (Water Code, § 85054.) Rather, the Project will harm and adversely impact each of these Delta values.

In its Final EIR, DWR concedes that the Project will have multiple significant and unavoidable impacts on cultural resources of the Delta. (See FEIR, pp. 18-213 to 18-219.) Construction of the conveyance facilities would

affect ten identified archaeological resources that occur in the Project footprint. (See FEIR, p. 18-213.) DWR identified these resources and found that they are likely to qualify as historical resources or unique archaeological resources under CEQA. (See *ibid.*; see also FEIR Appendix 18B.) In addition, ten identified historic-era built-environment resources have the potential to be directly or indirectly affected by constructing the water conveyance facilities. (See FEIR, pp. 18-216 and 18-217; See also FEIR Appendix 18B, p. 188-17 to 188-18.) These are resources, such as the Mosher House and George Cornish House of Clarksburg, that are eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places and the California Register of Historic Places. (*Ibid.*)

The County also submits with this appeal the written testimony of Dr. Robert Benedetti, which addresses the Project's impacts on Delta cultural resources. The written testimony of Reza Moghissi, filed herewith, describes how the Project's impacts on transportation in the Sacramento County portion of the Delta will affect the Delta lifestyle and economy.

The Final EIR acknowledges that "construction of the [Project] intakes and related water conveyance facilities would result in permanent and long-term (i.e., lasting over 2 years) impacts on well-established recreational opportunities and experiences in the study area because of access, noise, and visual setting disruptions that could result in loss of public use." (FEIR, p. 15-469.) Two recreation sites, Clifton Court Forebay and Cosumnes River Preserve, are within the construction footprint and six recreation sites or areas (Sone Lakes NWR, Clarksburg Boat Launch, Wimpy's Marina, Delta Meadows, Bullfrog Landing Marina, and Lazy M Marina) are within the 1,200 to 1,400-foot indirect impact area. (See FEIR, p. 15-468.) This is a significant and unavoidable impact. (See FEIR, p. 15-469.)

The written testimonies of Jeff Leatherman and Amber Veselka, filed herewith, further describe the Project's impacts on recreational resources within the Delta.

DWR concedes several significant and unavoidable Project impacts to Delta agricultural resources. (See FEIR, pp. 14-191 to 14-198.) "Permanent features associated with [the Project] could convert approximately 3,909 acres of Important Farmland and 2,035 acres of land subject to Williamson Act contracts to other uses." (FEIR, p. 14-191.) Further, the FEIR states that:

Alternative 4a [will have] effects related to seepage from the operation of forebays and from disruption of drainage and irrigation facilities during construction of water conveyance facilities. The conveyance alignment constructed under this alternative would cross or interfere with approximately miles of agricultural delivery

canals and drainage ditches. These activities could create indirect but adverse effects on agriculture by converting substantial amounts of Important Farmland and through disruption of drainage and irrigation facilities.

(FEIR, p. 14-192.)

Additionally, “[w]ater conveyance facility construction and operation could create a significant impact on agriculture by converting substantial amounts of Important Farmland to other uses through changes to groundwater elevation in localized areas and disruption of drainage and irrigation facilities.” (FEIR, p. 14-194.) These adverse results unquestionably fail to “protect and enhance” Delta agricultural resources.

The written testimony of Julie Jensen, Virginia Henley Chhabra, and Chrisandra Flores, all filed herewith, elaborate further on the Project’s adverse impacts to Delta agriculture.

The Project Does Not Protect, Restore and Enhance the Delta Ecosystem.

The Project fails to achieve the second of the Delta Plan’s coequal goals. Although the FEIR does not conclude that any significant and unavoidable impacts will occur to aquatic or terrestrial biological resources, the Project nevertheless cannot be said to “protect, restore and enhance” the Delta ecosystem. The FEIR divulges a multitude of Project impacts on aquatic and terrestrial biological resources that are significant prior to implementation of mitigation. (See, e.g., FEIR, pp. ES-67 to ES-117.) Note that implementation of mitigation measure results in few “beneficial” impacts. (See *ibid.*)

The Project’s three new intakes, which will each divert Sacramento River water at a rate of 3,000 cubic feet per second, will result in entrainment of fish, including listed species. While the proposed fish screens may arguably reduce the impact, this critical Project element does not restore or enhance the Delta ecosystem.

Project construction will undoubtedly have an adverse effect on both aquatic and terrestrial species. Construction impacts such as equipment noise, grading, digging and groundborne vibration, and visual impacts from artificial lighting will disorient, if not directly take, sensitive species. (See written testimony of Amber Veselka, filed herewith.)

Changes in Sacramento River flow rates and temperatures caused by the Project will also adversely affect aquatic species, including salmonids.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, in the accompanying written statements filed herewith, and in the written presentations that will be submitted pursuant to Section 11 of the DSC Administrative Procedures Governing Appeals, the County of Sacramento requests that the DSC remand the matter to the State for reconsideration of the covered action based on a finding that the certification of consistency is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See Water Code, § 85225.25.)

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9
10 BEFORE THE
11 CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD

12 HEARING ON THE MATTER OF
13 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES AND UNITED STATES
14 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REQUEST
FOR A CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION
15 FOR CALIFORNIA WATER FIX.

**PART TWO TESTIMONY OF DON
NOTTOLI**

16
17 **I. INTRODUCTION**

18 By way of introduction, my name is Don Nottoli and I am currently serving as a
19 member of the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors. First elected in 1994, I
20 represent the geographically large and diverse 5th District of Sacramento County, which
21 includes the Sacramento County portion of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. I will
22 soon begin my 40th year with Sacramento County, and as a long term elected
23 representative and lifelong resident, it has been my privilege and good fortune to serve
24 the people of this great county and to have come to know much of the geography and
25 many of the people in the communities I represent, including those in the Delta region.

26 **II. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

27 To bring a bit of focus to my testimony, I will devote much of my written submittal
28 to describing a long list of lasting impacts to the Delta and its people which, I believe,

1 will result from the proposed California WaterFix (WaterFix), should, in fact, it receive all
2 necessary regulatory permit approvals.

3 **III. DISCUSSION**

4 I trust that in the course of these hearings, you will get the opportunity to hear
5 from many people regarding the important matter before you. I implore you to carefully
6 consider the comments and concerns of those who reside, work, visit and represent the
7 Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.

8 Having previously served as a member of the Delta Stewardship Council and
9 currently the Delta Protection Commission and Delta Conservancy, I have had a
10 tremendous opportunity to work side-by-side with many dedicated and experienced folks
11 on water-management issues of vital importance to the Delta and its people, but in my
12 view, nothing holds a potentially greater impact to the long term viability and
13 sustainability of the Delta than the WaterFix.

14 The fact that we are engaged in this **Change of Point of Diversion Petition**
15 **hearing** reflects upon an insatiable demand for water; should the Petitions be granted to
16 accommodate the WaterFix, in my estimation, the Delta will be diminished as a place of
17 beauty and wonder, and the project itself will result in irreparable harm to the
18 environment, agriculture and a generations-old way of life.

19 Sacramento County, and the historic communities of Courtland, Hood, Locke and
20 Walnut Grove, will be "ground zero" for both construction and long term impacts
21 associated with the WaterFix. Many of these communities were settled around the time
22 of the Gold Rush era, and in some cases today are part of a legacy of seven, and even
23 eight, generations of farming families and Delta residents.

24 Instead of "reducing reliance on the Delta," as provided for in the 2009 Delta
25 Reform Act, Water Code Section 85021, which I presume means less impact, not more,
26 on the Delta, the WaterFix proposes two massive, 35-mile long tunnels, 40' in diameter,
27 be built underneath the Delta to improve reliability for water deliveries to downstream
28 customers. I pose the question as to whether this "reduces reliance," or in actuality,

1 assures continued, sustained and potentially increased reliance on the Delta.

2 We are told, in tens of thousands of pages of environmental documentation
3 prepared for the project that the WaterFix will not only improve water supply reliability but
4 will likely help protect, restore and enhance collapsing Delta ecosystems, and yet the
5 Petitioners bring a proposal filled with uncertainty, unanswered questions, lack of
6 enforceable protections, and a lengthy list of irreversible and often unmitigatable
7 impacts.

8 But, there is another important fact, though often lost in the drive to assure the
9 water supply portion of the co-equal goals, that needs to be acknowledged. The co-
10 equal goals are to be implemented in tandem and "shall be achieved in a manner that
11 protects and enhances the unique cultural, recreational, natural resources and
12 agricultural values of the Delta as an evolving place." (Wat. Code, § 85054.) In my
13 view, the Delta Reform Act makes it clear that the co-equal goals need to account for
14 reduced reliance on the Delta, improve the reliability of water supply and protect the
15 land, the ecosystem and the people of the Delta.

16 So, I respectfully ask this Board, in considering the Petitioners' request, to also
17 consider the tremendously damaging impacts which could and would result from this
18 project. To be clear, much of the project construction, including the proposed intakes,
19 miles of pipelines and the intermediate forebay are to be located in Sacramento County.

20 Please allow me to briefly paint another picture of project impacts. Imagine 100's
21 of additional truck trips per day on rural roads traveling throughout the Delta. Imagine
22 too, this snarling traffic crawling through Delta towns dotted with modest homes, small
23 businesses, schools, parks, churches and other amenities, and along with it the roar and
24 rumble of big rigs and other transports laden with materials of every shape and size.
25 Imagine too, this is not a temporal occurrence for only a short period of time; no, it may
26 last for one, two, three, four, five and ten or even more years.

27 Add to this all the daily activity of hundreds and hundreds, if not thousands, of
28 other vehicles squeezing onto rural two-lane, many of them levee roadways, and the

1 continued disruption of daily life and commerce, as well as interference with annual
2 planting and harvest seasons, for a decade or more.

3 And finally, add to the traffic congestion and frustration all the boring, drilling,
4 auguring, transporting, moving, dewatering, relocating, testing, collecting, sampling,
5 pumping, exploring, constructing, deconstructing, demolishing, burrowing, digging and
6 yet more trucking, and you get a fuller package of on-going activities which will serve to
7 disrupt, interrupt, destroy and I truly believe, forever change daily life in these Delta
8 communities and throughout the accompanying environment.

9 Quiet rural farming areas will be transformed into gigantic construction zones,
10 more akin to an industrial complex than tranquil country settings. Impacts of these
11 prolonged and intense activities, sometimes seven days a week, 24 hours a day for
12 years, including traffic generation, noise, vibrations, and general disruption, will
13 undoubtedly affect the quality of life and daily activities of these rural farming towns. It
14 will likely displace people from their homes, creating economic uncertainty for many
15 small businesses and farming pursuits, and negatively affect the recreational, fishing,
16 boating and ecotourism activities along hundreds of miles of waterways and in the Stone
17 Lakes National Wildlife Refuge.

18 In addition to this incessant activity, the question of what happens to all the
19 "spoils" generated from tunneling and other excavation sites needs to be pointed out.
20 This tunnel muck "wonder mud" as I refer to it, will be stockpiled in locations on 2,600
21 acres across the country-side for however long it takes to find a suitable permanent
22 location for the "reusable tunnel muck." Again, imagine, more than 30 million cubic
23 yards of this material, equivalent in mass to at least 10 Great Pyramids of Giza, stored
24 land side in piles 10-15 feet in height scattered throughout the Delta, impacting
25 aesthetics as well as virtually rendering useless sites which were formerly farmed or
26 used for other purposes.

27 The economy of the Delta, dependent primarily on agriculture and recreation, and
28 exceeding \$1 Billion annually, would be negatively affected in untold ways. And

1 meanwhile, the people, families from all walks of life, will have to endure nearly endless
2 construction related activities for more than a decade, no matter what the day or time.
3 And to what end? I believe it will bring a gradual but very real degradation and
4 destruction to the Delta from which there will be no recovery.

5 How then is it, I ask, that the Delta with its diversity of agriculture, wildlife habitat
6 and rural communities, will benefit from any of this? What real economic analysis has
7 been done which demonstrates the true cost/benefit components of this proposed
8 WaterFix? And why is the Delta region considered to be less valuable to our State than
9 other, more arid or populated regions of California? And why aren't more viable, 21st
10 century alternatives to the WaterFix given serious and thoughtful consideration?

11 I pose these questions as examples of unanswered questions, because they tend
12 to highlight what is really wrong with the WaterFix proposal. In great part, the Petitioners
13 are largely ignoring the impacts of this mega project on the Delta, and in so doing, are
14 sacrificing the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, and its many treasured resources for
15 benefit of other regions of California. This all-or-nothing approach is wrongheaded and
16 misguided. We should, as the Delta Reform Act mandates, protect the resources in the
17 Delta, both natural and manmade, for generations to come. Rather than pursuing a
18 multi-billion dollar project which damages the Delta, we should invest in our levees,
19 support our communities, protect our environment and preserve this very special place in
20 all the world, for today and for tomorrow.

21 I would encourage your Board to carefully examine the information before you
22 and to take a broader view of the impacts to Delta communities, the people who live and
23 work there and the environment. Please look to a brighter, bolder future where the
24 development of new water is accomplished in a manner which embraces and values all
25 communities and in a way which is both supportable and sustainable and which
26 comports with the co-equal goals while protecting the Delta.

27 It is important to note that the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is a key contributor
28 to the local, regional and state economies and is home to more than 500,000 people.

1 The Delta should not be viewed as just a plumbing fixture for movement of water in our
2 State, but valued for its many unique resources and connectivity to the Sierra
3 watersheds which feed our rivers as well as the San Francisco Bay Estuary and Pacific
4 Ocean.

5 I know we are challenged to find solutions to quench the thirst and meet the
6 needs of a growing California, but in order for the Delta to thrive and prosper, it will
7 require all of us to seek more creative and sustainable approaches to water
8 management in our state. To move this proposal, the WaterFix, and all its component
9 parts, forward would be the worst example of implementing sound and just public policy
10 as it is NOT the answer to California's long-term water management needs.

11 IV. CONCLUSION

12 As I close, I think it is entirely appropriate to offer a quote from Oliver Wendell
13 Holmes, Jr. which sums up where I believe we are with respect to consideration of the
14 gravity of this matter. Holmes said, "***A hundred years after we are gone and
15 forgotten, those who never heard of us will be living with our words and actions.***"

16 The Delta is worthy of our focused attention and we should do everything we
17 possibly can to protect and preserve it for future generations.

18 Let us hope that 100 years from now, people from throughout the Sacramento-
19 San Joaquin Delta and all of California, can proudly know and honestly say that we, in
20 our time, did the "right thing" in the decisions we made to serve the Delta, its people, the
21 environment and the people of the great State of California.

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9
10 BEFORE THE
11 CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD

12 HEARING ON THE MATTER OF
13 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES AND UNITED STATES
14 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REQUEST
FOR A CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION
15 FOR CALIFORNIA WATER FIX.

**PART TWO TESTIMONY OF ROBERT
BENEDETTI**

16
17 **I. INTRODUCTION**

18 My name is Robert Benedetti and I submit this testimony on behalf of Sacramento
19 County in Part Two of the California WaterFix (WaterFix) petition for change proceeding
20 pending before the California State Water Resources Control Board. Relevant to this
21 proceeding, I was Co-Director of Delta Narratives, a project to assemble historical
22 records of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and to relate that record to regional and
23 national trends. I hold a doctorate in Political Science from the University of
24 Pennsylvania. I have taught and been an academic administrator at New College
25 (Florida) and the University of the Pacific. Currently, I am a research scholar at the
26 Center for California Studies, CSU Sacramento. I have been chair of both the Florida
27 Endowment for the Humanities and California Humanities as well as served on the board
28

1 of the Federation of State Humanities Councils. My curriculum vitae is Exhibit SACO-3.

2 **II. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

3 My testimony will demonstrate the historical and cultural significance of the
4 Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. My analysis focuses particularly on the portion of the
5 Delta from Hood to Courtland as this is one area most at risk from the implementation of
6 the WaterFix project. In my opinion, the built environment, the natural environment, the
7 transportation venues, and the historical artifacts of the region provide a unique view of
8 California's evolution from a refuge for native peoples, a testing ground for agricultural
9 innovation, a mecca for recreation, and a tourist destination. The Delta has attracted the
10 attention of artists and writers as well as immigrants from every continent. To preserve
11 its stories, it is necessary to protect the environment out of which they grow. The
12 WaterFix will inalterably change the material and natural environment within the
13 Sacramento River Delta, particularly between Clarksburg and Walnut Grove, and
14 fundamentally compromise its unique cultural and historic resources.

15 **III. DISCUSSION**

16 "If this Delta were almost anywhere but California –it would no doubt have
17 been heralded as a major scenic wonder and perhaps would be protected
as a national park."¹

18 The Sacramento River Delta between Clarksburg and Walnut Grove is the
19 epicenter of the proposed WaterFix construction and operation. The area between Hood
20 and Courtland will be particularly impacted by both construction activity and the effects of
21 the WaterFix's permanent facilities. These portions of the Delta are key to the
22 preservation of the region's historic and cultural heritage and to providing an opportunity
23 for future generations to experience the patterns of life in 19th and 20th century California.

24 **A. Prehistoric Cultural Resources**

25 Plains Miwok tribelets were strung along the Sacramento River on the eastern as
26 well as the western banks from Rio Vista north for as many as 10,000 years. While little
27

28 ¹ Richard Dillon, Delta Country, Forward (1982).

1 of their material culture survives, the habitat which supported their long and generally
2 tranquil existence remains. Their reverence for nature has impressed observers
3 including John Muir and Malcolm Margoles and continues to challenge assumptions
4 about environmental sustainability. The Bay Delta Conservation Plan/WaterFix Final
5 Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement (FEIR/EIS) identifies
6 multiple archeological sites in Sacramento County potentially affected by Alternative 4A.²
7 The FEIR/EIS also documents the multiple archeological sites which have yet to be fully
8 explored and which new techniques may make available to us.³

9 Dr. Narciso Duran recorded detailed observations of the lower Sacramento River
10 in 1817, but the Spanish did not choose to settle the area. Even before the Spanish and
11 Mexican governments sold off Delta lands to private entrepreneurs, malaria and
12 smallpox epidemics decimated native populations. Those possessing land grants
13 focused settlements in Sacramento, Stockton, and the Pittsburg/Antioch region, leaving
14 much of the Delta open for future immigrants.

15 **B. Historic-Era Cultural Resources**

16 **1. Accessible Properties**

17 It is well known that the world rushed in to California to find gold following its
18 discovery in 1849. Less appreciated are the choices made by miners who did not strike it
19 rich. An option for many was farming the rich soils of the Delta, which the 49ers had
20 witnessed on the boat ride from San Francisco to Sacramento, the gateway to the
21 northern mines. With funds saved from successful prospecting, Josiah Buckman Greene
22 bought property on the western side of Sacramento River sight unseen in 1850. Greene
23 later expanded his holdings on the eastern side, where the house bearing the Greene
24 name still stands. He and his family were responsible for early levee building and had a

25 _____
26 ² Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, App. 18 B, p. 18B-1; Table 18B-1 identifies CA-SAC-21, CA-SAC-395,
CA-SAC-056, CA-SAC-057, and CA-SAC-062.

27 ³ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p. 18-133: 39-42; As noted in Appendix 18A at 18A-5: 31-34, the
28 presence of numerous recorded prehistoric resources, and the presence of landforms that are sensitive for
additional unidentified resources, suggests that the action alternatives will disturb both additional
resources that can be identified through inventory, and buried resources that cannot be feasibly identified.

1 talent for the use of technology including the early dredger.

2 Though the Greene family focused on cattle ranching, over time, a branch of the
3 family planted pear trees on the so-called Pierson parcel on the east bank of the
4 Sacramento. There have now been five generations from Joseph Greene raising pears
5 at this location. Jane Wolff points out the importance of pear farming for the culture of
6 this area:

7 Pears engenders rituals. The Pear Fair is held every July in Courland;
8 people eat pear fritters, and the new Pear Queen is crowned. There
9 are pear dynasties. The history of the north Delta can be told through
10 the stories of pear families like the McCormacks, the Wilsons, the
 Learys, the Eliots, the Greenes, the Caseys, the Mealers, the Van
 Lobensels, the Fongs, and the Gardeners.⁴

11 According to the FEIR/EIS, the Greene home between Hood and Courtland has
12 been overlooking the Sacramento River since 1876.⁵ The FEIR/EIS also indicates the
13 potential for a significant impact on this dwelling with the implementation of WaterFix,
14 including a permanent visual impact.⁶ The impacts to the Greene home are an example
15 of the WaterFix's acknowledged significant and unavoidable impacts on built-
16 environment cultural resources due to direct demolition or changes in the setting that
17 remove the resource or substantially alter the resource character.⁷

18 The Greene home and farm is hardly the only historic building along Delta
19 waterways. An evaluation of historical resources undertaken in 2012 and 2013 as part of
20 the preparations for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan found 680 structures of potential
21 historical value, but only 440 or two thirds could be accessed directly. Fifty-five (55) of
22 the 440 were found to be significant, using rigorous government standards of value.⁸
23 Thus, the Greene home and others along the River Road between Hood and Courtland
24

25 ⁴ Jane Wolff, *Delta Primer: A Field Guide to the California Delta* (2003), p. 140.

26 ⁵ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, App. 18B, p. 18B-49:28.

27 ⁶ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, App. 18B, p. 18B-69, PTO_016_001. Direct physical impacts to the
Greene property are discussed more fully in the Part 2 testimony of Virginia Hemly Chhabra.

28 ⁷ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p. 18-142:20-24, 30-31.

⁸ Addendum 1 to *The Built Historical Resources Evaluation Report for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan Project* (ICF: September, 2013), p. 11. (2013 Built Resources Report)

1 are part of a chain of architectural gems documenting the story of agribusiness and
2 settlement in the Delta. Their restoration and maintenance is an important part of
3 maintaining and establishing cultural tourism in the region as testified by the role of
4 historical restoration in the establishment of National Heritage Areas nationally that have
5 benefited from increased tourism like the Erie Canal in upstate New York.

6 **2. Inaccessible Properties**

7 The 2013 Built Resources Report lists 12 sites in Sacramento County which were
8 not accessible and therefore not evaluated for historical or cultural value.⁹ Two were in
9 Hood and one in Courtland.¹⁰ An additional five were on the River Road near these
10 towns.¹¹ Clearly given the significance of other buildings in these areas, the fact that
11 these structures have not been evaluated opens the possibility that residences of historic
12 value are undercounted and have not yet been appropriately evaluated for potential
13 mitigation to address unknown significant impacts associated with historic, inaccessible
14 properties.

15 **3. Adopted Mitigation Inadequate to Protect Resources Because Cannot
16 Retain Historic Character and Setting Once Disturbed**

17 The FEIR/EIS discusses mitigation for three historic structures along the River
18 Road between Freeport and Courtland: the Mosher House (mistakenly listed in Yolo
19 County), The Greene House, and the Rosebud Rancho. The FEIR/EIS recommends
20 that the Mosher House be moved, the Greene House be “stabilized” and possibly moved
21 temporarily, and the Rosebud Rancho be ignored since it has sustained fire damage.
22 Since a substantial part of the value of these residences is their location, relocation
23 would substantially lessen their value and impact on visitors. Temporary relocation and
24 “mothballing” would take portions of the Greene property out of commission for an
25 indeterminate period risking mold and other destructive forces. While the Rosebud
26 Rancho may be damaged, refusing to protect it may jeopardize any future restoration of

27 ⁹ 2013 Built Resources Report, p. 22.

28 ¹⁰ 2013 Built Resources Report, p. 22.

¹¹ 2013 Built Resources Report, p. 22.

1 a property long seen as valuable to the region and often included on tourist agendas.

2 **C. Historic Communities**

3 In addition to native habitats, historic homes, and long established agricultural
4 businesses, the eastern side of the Sacramento River benefited from the founding of
5 several towns, two of which survive to the present day. Both Hood and Courtland have
6 been recognized by the California Legislature as “Legacy Communities”. These towns
7 provide the anchors for any attempt to vitalize the Delta as a center for those attempting
8 to trace the history of the region. Among their stories are the resilience of their citizens in
9 accommodating changing modes of transportation (boats, rail, cars, pleasure craft),
10 changing market conditions for food, shifting dreams for community development, and
11 the vagaries of nature (subsidence, flooding, salinization).

12 The 2012 *Built Historical Resources Evaluation Report for the Bay Delta*
13 *Conservation Plan Project* sums up their historical value:

14 The early development of Hood and Courtland was driven by fruit
15 production and other agricultural activity Initially known as
16 Richland, Hood was established in 1860 as a river landing with a
17 warehouse and school house... Courtland was founded in 1867,
18 when a post office was moved there from across Steamboat Slough.
19 Encompassing wharves, a hotel, and stores, Courtland experienced
20 continued growth after 1900. Unlike other Delta landing settlements,
21 Courtland sent its fruits and vegetables to other towns for ...
22 processing. Eschewing industry, Courtland remained a residential
23 settlement and agricultural shipping center with a wharf and a
24 commercial district serving area farmers. Courtland and Richland
25 would remain well known for pear production into the twentieth
26 century.

27 ... In 1909, the Southern Pacific Company named the small shipping
28 enclave for William Hood, a Southern Pacific engineer who planned a
rail spur from the landing to Franklin Junction on the Sacramento
Southern Railroad, As a complement to its rail spur to Hood, the
Southern Pacific erected a wharf on the Sacramento River. The
building continues to stand today...

The Southern Pacific partnered with Madison P. Barnes to develop a
residential community adjacent to the new shipping facilities. A
prominent Sacramento businessman and civic leader, Barnes is
credited with founding the real estate development firm Hood
Improvement Company in 1909.... Early promotional efforts tied the
development—fancifully dubbed “a New Netherlands”—to SP’s
Netherlands Route, a steamboat passenger line between
Sacramento and San Francisco...William Barnes commissioned the

1 1914 construction of a twenty-one-room Netherlands Hotel (no longer
2 extant). Barnes' efforts were poorly timed, however, and Hoods
3 residential growth remained limited for several decades. Around the
4 Southern Pacific wharf, however, several growers' associations and
5 companies established warehouses, packinghouses, and cold
6 storage facilities ...¹²

7 The two towns encapsulate the economic history of the Delta and California in
8 their boom and bust cycles, reliance on global agricultural markets, close ties to
9 transportation conglomerates and experimentation residential development. Importantly,
10 the architectural footprints of each cycle are still visible in their precincts.

11 With the introduction of the outboard motor and improvements in pleasure craft,
12 Courtland also became a mecca for recreational activities on the water. Hal Schell, long
13 considered the informal spokesperson for the Delta's waterways, wrote in 1995:

14 Courtland Docks is a comfortable little marina here with guest
15 docking, fuel, cocktails, a café and some supplies...Cruising this
16 section of the river, you will pass a surprising number of marinas.
17 Although few are imposing each has its own personality and adds to
18 the overall charm of the Delta. Each has its river rats and its live-a-
19 boards and its own local characters.¹³

20 In other words, the Delta evolved from agricultural hub to a resort and escape for
21 dropouts and sports men from the Bay Area and farther afield. Earle Stanley Gardner,
22 the author who invented Perry Mason, chronicled many of these characters in three
23 books on the Delta. And, as journalist and yachtsman, Robert Walters reminds those
24 visiting Courtland,

25 Behind those high levees are streets and old buildings straight out of
26 a rural 1915 movie set. Along the way, there is also some fascinating
27 architecture in the grand farmer estate manner. From your boat,
28 these spots can be located by the fine stand of old trees, plantation
style, reaching about the river banks.¹⁴

Given the significance of these communities to the historic and cultural character
of the Delta, it is surprising that the FEIR/EIS does not discuss how community life will

¹² *The Built Historical Resources Evaluation Report for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan Project*
(ICF:September, 2012), pp. 43-44.

¹³ Hal Schell, *Cruising California's Delta* (1995), p. 35.

¹⁴ Robert E. Walters, *Cruising the California Delta* (1972), p. 24.

1 be sustained during and following the implementation of the WaterFix. Traffic will make
2 daily contacts difficult and damage the transactions of business.¹⁵ Customers and
3 residences will not be able to continue routines; community events, such as the annual
4 Courtland Pear Fair, that contribute to community cohesion and identity, and also attract
5 substantial numbers of visitors, likely will be disrupted.¹⁶ Investments may be put on
6 hold. Some residents may leave, others not arrive. Safety that had been taken for
7 granted may no longer be secure.¹⁷ For these towns to survive as social units, the
8 boomtown milieu that often accompanies a construction site needs to be avoided.

9 **D. Historic Transportation Routes**

10 State Highway 160, which runs the length of the Delta from Sacramento to
11 Antioch has been designated a Scenic Highway because of the beauty and history of the
12 scenes that one passes on a drive along its winding way. It fulfills the purposes and
13 deserves the protections implicit in the legislation that formed the designation:

14 260. It is the intent of the Legislature in designating certain portions of
15 the state highway system as state scenic highways to establish the
16 State's responsibility for the protection and enhancement of
17 California's natural scenic beauty by identifying those portions of the
18 state highway system which, together with the adjacent scenic
19 corridors, require special scenic conservation treatment. It is further
20 declared to be the intent of the Legislature in designating such scenic
21 highways to assign responsibility for the development of such scenic
22 highways and for the establishment and application of specific
23 planning and design standards and procedures appropriate thereto
24 and to indicate, in broad statement terms, the location and extent of
25 routes and areas requiring continuing and careful co-ordination of
26 planning, design, construction, and regulation of land use and
27 development, by state and local agencies as appropriate, to protect
28 the social and economic values provided by the State's scenic
resources.¹⁸

¹⁵ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, pp. 19-210-211, 215, CT-23, -24, -25, -26, -27, -28; SC 09, 10 (showing WaterFix will generate substantial increases in hourly traffic volumes on all segments of Highway 160/River Road from City of Sacramento limits to Walnut Grove Bridge); Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p. 19-218:5-9 (indicating it is likely that these impacts could remain significant and unavoidable, even after mitigation).

¹⁶ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p. 23-132; 5-11, 20-24; Figure 23A-04, Figure 23A-11 (discussing disruptive noise associated with intake and surface construction activities and truck traffic); see also pp. 23-134 – 23-136 (identifying the adverse effects of groundborne vibration from intake construction).

¹⁷ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p. 3B-81 (recognizing potential for theft and vandalism in major construction sites after work hours); See Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, Figure M3-4: Sheet 2 of 15 (showing approximately 120-acre construction work area immediately adjacent to the Town of Hood).

¹⁸ Streets and Highway Code, State of California, Sections 260-284.

1 In particular, the section between Sacramento and Walnut Grove has been
2 recognized as typifying Delta culture. In 1971 when Sunset magazine published “Back
3 Roads of California” by Earl Thollander, it selected this particular stretch of Highway 160
4 to feature: “The Sacramento River is on your left and below on the right is the vast
5 farming area of the delta. Pretty country towns along the way are Clarksburg and
6 Courtland.”¹⁹

7 The novelist Gayle Brandeis captures one’s emotional response to driving near
8 Courtland:

9
10 We drove past grand estates, crumbling canning houses, lots of little
11 wooden markets, orchard after orchard after orchard as the road
12 curved with the greenish river. At some point, we took a small ferry,
13 free of charge, that was pulled across the water by cables; it was big
14 enough for maybe six cars, although ours was the only one to make
15 the three-minute crossing. Quinn was thrilled—she said it felt like we
16 were being transported back in time as we floated to the other side.
17 Time did seem to change in the Delta; I could feel my internal clock
18 begin to slow, start to turn as languid as the Sacramento.²⁰

19 This idyllic route will be physically altered forever with the relocation of the
20 highway at each of the three intakes, thereby taking passers by 220 feet further inland
21 from the river.²¹ Certainly, the visual aesthetic of the highway in and around the intakes
22 will starkly contrast with the relatively placid surroundings elsewhere on the route.²²
23 Construction will change the driving experience for 10+ years on Highway 160 given the
24 increases in traffic volumes from Sacramento to Walnut Grove.²³

25 **E. The Prerequisites for Cultural Tourism**

26 That the State of California intends to preserve and protect the historical and
27 cultural values inherent in the Delta generally and in the portion from Hood to Courtland
28 specifically is made manifest in the multiple citations of state and local ordinances noted

¹⁹ See Earl Thollander, *Back Roads of California* (1971), p. 178.

²⁰ Gayle Brandeis, *Delta Girls* (2010), p. 7.

²¹ Exhibit DWR-212, p. 12-1.

²² Exhibit DWR-212, p. 6-3; see also SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, App. 17D-29, 30, 31 (describing “very noticeable effect” on viewers at intake locations).

²³ Exhibit SWRCB-102, pp. 19-210-211, 215 (CT-23, -24, -25, -26, -27, -28; SC 09, 10).

1 in the FEIR/EIS, Chapter 18. However, the analysis there relies on hypothetical impacts
2 on casual visitors. It does not adequately take into account the fatigue factor that would
3 weigh on visitors, property and business owners, and potential investors in cultural
4 tourism institutions over the course of construction, and subsequently during operation of
5 the WaterFix. In my opinion, the WaterFix has insufficient mitigation for the significant
6 impacts of construction and operation (including permanent physical effects of the
7 WaterFix diversion structures and related facilities) to balance against the significant
8 impacts both to the specific area and for the development of the Delta as a living and
9 cultural archive. The opinions of residents and sensitive observers like artists and
10 writers need to be consulted. It is significant that residents who have left the area are
11 currently returning for retirement attracted by the ambiance of the area. Further, a
12 number of internationally recognized artists, including Wayne Thiebaud, Ning Hou, and
13 Greg Kondos, as well as photographers like Rich Turner, continue to focus major works
14 on the Delta and in particular the stretch from Freeport to Walnut Grove.

15 One of the specific vulnerabilities for cultural tourism regarding the WaterFix
16 project relates to potential investment in historical restoration in the Courtland-Hood
17 area. Clarksburg, across the Sacramento River, already has begun several restoration
18 projects in the hope of generating sufficient sites to stimulate cultural tourism. More
19 generally, the Delta Protection Commission's pursuit of a National Heritage Area
20 Designation, as discussed below, is based on the assumption that the Delta region will
21 continue to improve its access to significant artifacts and interrelate the stories of its
22 various settlements. It is reasonable to expect that the WaterFix will effectively put on
23 hold any participation by the Courtland-Hood communities to achieve this designation
24 and substantially impede efforts to attract outside investors to such initiatives. However,
25 formal designation by state or federal authorities as a cultural or historic resource is not
26 necessary to further articulate the narratives of these towns, as well as their physical
27 structures. Generally speaking, private foundations and local organizations do not
28 define projects worthy of investment based on governmental approval designation; it is

1 the physical and historic character of the area that is most important. Nevertheless, the
2 inability to obtain, or delay in obtaining, a notable designation may have long-term
3 consequences for protection of the area. Moreover, those interested in preservation
4 may come from outside a town's limits: history buffs in Elk Grove have long taken tours
5 to the Rosebud Rancho, built in 1887, but remodeled in 1990, and located on the
6 Sacramento River just north of the Town of Hood. However, the FEIR/EIS suggests the
7 property is in such disrepair that it should be declassified as a National Historical Site.²⁴
8 The FEIR/EIS states that WaterFix would result in a permanent surface impact including
9 adding an access road and transmission line at the site.²⁵ In my opinion, the permanent
10 alteration of the site, including the likely further deterioration of the property during the
11 lengthy WaterFix construction, would thus slow, if not make impossible, any attempt to
12 restore this National Register property.

13 While each of the five Delta counties has developed future oriented plans for the
14 region, the most visionary plan, developed by the Delta Protection Commission in the
15 form of a proposal, is the application for a Delta Heritage Area addressed to the
16 Department of the Interior and the U.S. Congress.²⁶ It sets out the following vision and
17 six goals:

18 **Vision:**

19 A regional network of partner sites with interpretive/educational components that
20 will be linked where possible and serve as the primary attractions, on existing public
21 properties or on private properties with the voluntary consent and involvement of the
22 landowners.

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24
25
26 ²⁴ Exhibit SWRCB-102, App.18B, p. 18B-17, 69, PTO_010_002.

27 ²⁵ SWRCB-102, App.18B, p. 18B-69, PTO_010_002.

28 ²⁶ National Heritage Areas are designated by Congress as places where natural, cultural, and historic resources combine to form a cohesive, nationally prominent landscape. Public-private partnerships are critical to the success of community-driven heritage conservation and economic development.

1 **Goals:**

- 2 1) Identify the Delta as a region of national significance to educate the public
3 about 'Delta as a Place', and build more support for preserving, protecting,
4 and enhancing the Delta.
- 5 2) Support economic development of the Delta by drawing visitors to designated
6 partner sites, as well as local markets, restaurants, hotels, campgrounds, bed
7 and breakfasts, hostels, farmstays, and other recreation and visitor facilities.
- 8 3) Promote heritage tourism, ecotourism, and agritourism, which are aligned with
9 existing activities, infrastructure, and land uses in the Delta. Maintain Delta
10 agriculture while improving public access and developing necessary visitor
11 amenities in the Delta such as public restrooms, garbage receptacles,
12 directional signage, and dockage.
- 13 4) Make available maps of partner sites which identify waterways and byways to
14 connect the sites.
- 15 5) Undertake and provide resources for historic preservation projects at partner
16 sites with the consent and involvement of willing landowners.
- 17 6) Develop interpretive signage to educate the public about the Delta's natural,
18 historical and cultural heritage; and support programs which teach Delta
19 history.²⁷

20 In my opinion, the WaterFix will substantially undermine the vision and the
21 attainment of its specific goals. In fact, it likely will retard progress that has already been
22 made in regard to tourism and recreation. *The Feasibility Study for a Sacramento San*
23 *Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area* (July 2012), at p. 33, states:

24 Recreation is an integral part of the Delta economy, generating roughly 12
25 million visitor days of use annually and approximately \$250 million dollars
26 of visitor spending in the Delta each year. Of the roughly 12 million visitor
27 days spent in the Delta each year, approximately 8 million days are for
28 resource-related activities (e.g., boating and skiing), 2 million days are for

²⁷ Delta Protection Commission, *Feasibility Study for a Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area* (July, 2012), p. 37.

1 right-of-way related tourism activities (e.g., bicycling and driving for
2 pleasure), and 2 million days are for urban parks-related activities (e.g.,
3 picnicking and organized sports). Boating and skiing have the biggest
4 economic impact, and are estimated to generate nearly 80 percent of the
5 recreation and tourism spending in the Delta, including significant
6 expenditures on lodging, meals, supplies, marina services, and fuel. Delta
7 recreation and tourism supports over 3,000 jobs in the Delta counties.
8 These jobs provide over \$100 million in labor income and over \$175
9 million in value added to the regional economy. Across all of California,
10 Delta recreation and tourism supports over 5,300 jobs, and contributes
11 about \$353 million in value added.

12 It is reasonable to expect that the WaterFix project will slow or prevent the
13 realization of all six goals. The Delta could be identified as a redistribution station for a
14 natural resource in the public mind rather than an historical cultural region. Damage to
15 the environmental ambiance will impede the development of "partner sites" including
16 markets, restaurants, and visitor facilities. The impact of WaterFix likely will deter
17 agritourism, ecotourism, and heritage tourism by impairing local farming, habitats, and
18 historic structures. The potential for such growth is illustrated by the current success of
19 the Old Sugar Mill, a venture integrating the telling of industrial history, agritourism, and
20 a pleasing habitat. It is in Clarksburg directly across from the Hood/Courtland area.
21 Mapping, as contemplated by the goals for implementing the Delta Heritage Area vision,
22 will be a meaningless exercise if, as would occur under WaterFix, the waterways and
23 byways lack aesthetic, environmental, or recreational interest. The uncertainty
24 surrounding the impact of the WaterFix on the region's economy and environment will
25 reduce the number of partners willing to support historic preservation projects in the
26 Delta. Finally, the Delta experience will not be able to fulfill its promise as a way to teach
27 historical and environmental realities to visitors as the material culture and habitats will
28 no longer be accessible; its narratives will wither without the preservation of a cohesive
physical setting to reinforce the viewer's imagination.

29 In sum, the historical and cultural heritage of the Hood/Courtland corridor has
30 been an important part of the Sacramento San Joaquin narrative for over 10,000 years.
31 From the Native American experience through the agricultural boom following the Gold
32 Rush and subsequent revolutions in transportation, to the rise of the Delta for recreation

1 and escape, this area has been fully engaged. The WaterFix puts at significant risk the
2 preservation of historic sites and the promotion of tourism in the region. Many who reflect
3 on the future of the Delta have concluded that agritourism, eco-tourism, and heritage
4 tourism is an appropriate future; the WaterFix not only will result in the loss of distinct
5 and cohesive cultural and historic resources, but also will substantially impede, and
6 perhaps prevent, the goals for the Delta to attain National Heritage Area status and to
7 become an internationally recognized tourist destination like the Erie Canal has become
8 in recent years in the state of New York.

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**PART TWO TESTIMONY OF JULI
JENSEN**

16
17 **I. INTRODUCTION**

18 My name is Juli Jensen and I am the Agricultural Commissioner for Sacramento
19 County. I have served as the Commissioner since 2011 but have worked in the
20 Sacramento County Agricultural Commissioner's Office for 36 years, since 1981, with
21 one year spent in El Dorado and Alpine Counties as the Agricultural Commissioner
22 there. I have a Bachelor's degree in Agronomy from the University of California, Davis. I
23 have experience working in agriculture both at the state level for the California
24 Department of Food and Agriculture and the Illinois Department of Agriculture as well as
25 at the county level for San Joaquin, Sacramento, El Dorado, and Alpine counties.

26 **II. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

27 My testimony addresses the extent and nature of agriculture and related attributes
28 throughout the Delta, with a focus on the portion lying within Sacramento County. I also

1 discuss how the California Water Fix could impact long-term agricultural production in
2 Sacramento County.

3 **III. DISCUSSION**

4 **A. The Setting**

5 The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta encompasses the final watershed of the
6 confluence of both the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. It is located in five northern
7 California counties: Contra Costa, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Solano, and Yolo. It is
8 comprised of both mainland and numerous small islands.

9 Much of the soil of the Delta is peaty and provides a rich nutritional agricultural
10 substrate. This soil has produced some of the richest agricultural land in California since
11 it first came under production during the gold rush to produce fresh fruits and vegetables
12 for the miners. The Delta covers 738,000 acres of which 73% or 538,000 acres is
13 devoted to agriculture.¹ The level ground, fertile peat soils, moderate marine climate,
14 and year round supply of fresh water made the Delta arguably the richest farming area in
15 California for many years and it still remains among the state's most productive
16 agricultural regions, with per acre yields that are almost 50% higher than the state's
17 average.² About 75% of the agricultural land in the Delta is classified as Prime Farmland
18 (land with the best physical and chemical characteristics and reliable irrigation water).³
19 The diversified crops of the Delta account for an average of \$654,766,017 in annual
20 gross agricultural revenue.⁴ This figure does not take into account the secondary
21 benefits of this agriculture to the local economies which accounts for another \$2 billion.⁵
22 If the Delta were a county, its agricultural production value would rank 15th out of 58
23 counties.⁶ Agriculture contributes 7.3% of all California jobs but that is likely to be a
24 higher percentage in the Delta due to the labor intensity of many of its orchard and
25

26 ¹ <http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/delta.cfm>.

27 ² Context Memorandum: Agriculture in the Delta, Iteration 2, Delta Vision.

28 ³ Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/S, p. 14-12.

⁴ Context Memorandum: Agriculture in the Delta Iteration 2, Delta Vision.

⁵ Overview of Delta Agriculture, Restorethedelta.org.

⁶ Context Memorandum: Agriculture in the Delta, Iteration 2, Delta Vision.

1 vineyard crops.

2 But farming in the Delta is not without its challenges. One challenge is the water
3 quality and the intrusion of salt water or brackish water from the Bay making that water
4 unfit for irrigation of crops. This problem is even more significant during droughts which
5 decrease the fresh water flow through the Delta. Another challenge is the conversion of
6 farmland due to urbanization, building of ranchettes and land conversion for public open
7 space uses. Some of the highest rates of farmland conversion are taking place in San
8 Joaquin and Sacramento Counties.⁷ These two counties make up 75% of the land
9 contained in the Delta.⁸

10 The crops grown in the Delta are diversified and they are the principle land use in
11 the Delta. The permanent crops are primarily vineyards and fruit orchards. The Delta has
12 long been the top pear producing region in California; specifically, Sacramento County
13 has been the top pear producing county in California for many years with California
14 being the third highest pear producer in the nation.⁹ Recently, higher value vineyards of
15 wine grapes have replaced some orchards and many acres of annual crops. Other
16 permanent or semi-permanent crops include alfalfa and turf grass in Sacramento
17 County. Annual crops in the Delta in Sacramento County include corn, other grains,
18 safflower, hay, and tomatoes. Some areas of the Delta have already switched to lower
19 risk crops that can better withstand the salinity, for example in Sacramento County,
20 some areas of the Delta have converted to grazing and animal production which can
21 withstand higher salinity than some permanent crops.¹⁰

22 Agriculture in the Delta is not only important for its food production and creation of
23 jobs directly and indirectly related to agriculture. It also provides wildlife habitat,
24 recreation, and scenic open space. Many growers leave uncultivated areas that serve as
25 wetland or riparian habitat for wildlife including many species listed in the Endangered
26

27 ⁷ Context Memorandum: Agriculture in the Delta, Iteration 2, Delta Vision.

⁸ Context Memorandum: Agriculture in the Delta” Iteration 2, Delta Vision.

⁹ 2016 Crop & Livestock Report Sacramento County.

¹⁰ Context Memorandum: Agriculture in the Delta, Iteration 2, Delta Vision.

1 Species Act. The cultivated field crops are suitable sites for the Sandhill Crane and the
2 many waterfowl that pass through on their annual migrations. The development of
3 agricultural tourism involving wineries and roadside farm stands increase the
4 recreational use of the Delta. Agriculture supports the rural historically and culturally rich
5 communities of the Delta. Growers, through the payment of property taxes and water
6 and reclamation district fees support the maintenance of critical Delta infrastructure
7 including roads, water conveyance and levees. Diminishment in funding for levees could
8 result in failure of these levees, which would not only destroy the agriculture and
9 infrastructure of the region but would also alter the salinity balance in the Delta affecting
10 the local wildlife and the quality and quantity of the water available from the Delta to the
11 Central Valley and Southern California.

12 Agricultural producers in the Delta tend to be medium sized farms owned by
13 families that have farmed in this area for several generations and are experienced in the
14 management of this land, including the challenges presented by the water table.
15 Increasing land prices make it difficult for small farms to survive in the Delta. There has
16 been a significant increase in public or quasi-public land ownership, including land held
17 by the Nature Conservancy, Stone Lakes National Wildlife Refuge, and White Slough
18 Wildlife Area in Sacramento County.¹¹ Many of these lands continue, at least currently,
19 in agricultural production. The shift to public lands does have implications on the local
20 tax base and reclamation and water district revenues. It diminishes the funds available to
21 maintain Delta agricultural and community services and infrastructure, including levees.

22 **B. Water Fix Impacts**

23 Construction of the proposed twin tunnel water conveyance system will have a
24 profound effect on the agricultural production in Sacramento County in the Delta.
25 Review of the various proposals indicates that construction will result in not only taking
26 agricultural lands directly out of production for varying lengths of time but also disruption
27 of various transportation arteries used for production, harvest, and transport of the

28 ¹¹ publiclands.org.

1 agricultural commodities of the Delta. As mentioned earlier, the lands that would be
2 taken out of production are among the most fertile and productive agricultural lands in
3 California.

4 Some of the agricultural land would be taken up by construction of the intakes
5 and deposit of tunnel materials and would never be available to return to agricultural
6 production again.¹² Relying on the lost agricultural revenue and income reduction
7 calculations of Dr. Jeffrey Michael in Exhibit SDWA-134R, p. 7, I have roughly calculated
8 the economic impact to Sacramento County associated with permanent conversions.
9 Relying on Figure M3-4, Sheets, 1, 2, and 5 of Exhibit SWRCB-102, my office
10 determined that about 1,000 acres of Sacramento County agricultural land would be
11 permanently lost to agricultural production. Assuming lost revenue of \$1,949 per acre in
12 2009 dollars (Exhibit SDWA-134R, p.7:17-19), lost agricultural revenue for Sacramento
13 County would be about \$1.9 million per year in 2009 dollars. Assuming each million
14 dollars of Delta agricultural output supported 12.2 jobs and \$859,000 in income (Exhibit
15 SDWA-134R, p. 7:21-24), lost production in Sacramento County would eliminate about
16 24 jobs and reduce income by about \$1.7 million in 2009 dollars, or about \$1.9 million in
17 2016 dollars.

18 Some of these lands may not be removed from production permanently, but for
19 some period of time; all indications point to at the very least more than two years and
20 possibly up to 10 years. Even this short term or temporary disruption of production will
21 have dramatic effects on Delta agriculture. These medium sized farms cannot withstand
22 the removal from production of their lands for any significant period of time. Land that is
23 removed from production temporarily may eventually be available for agricultural
24 production again but the current families that farm them may not have the financial
25 resources to survive in agriculture until those lands are ready to return to farming. Farm
26 economies are such that few to none of our growers could survive the loss of their
27 production for prolonged periods.

28 ¹² Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/S, pp. 14-111-112.

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**PART TWO TESTIMONY OF
VIRGINIA HEMLY CHHABRA**

15
16 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

17 My name is Virginia Hemly Chhabra. I have been the packing house manager at
18 Greene and Hemly, Inc. since 1997. My testimony addresses the direct and indirect
19 effects of the California Water "Fix" on Greene and Hemly, Inc. and the community
20 surrounding our operation.

21 **II. DISCUSSION**

22 Greene and Hemly is a family owned and operated grower, packer, and shipper of
23 pears and apples in the Sacramento River Delta. Our family history is a little unusual for
24 California, in that we have been in the same place since 1850. Our history is not that
25 unusual for the Delta however. There are many people up and down the river that share
26 a similar family story, a history tied to the place as much as to the people. We are still
27 here because of a bone-deep love for the land, this place. It really isn't exaggerating to
28 say that there is no other place like it on Earth.

1 I occasionally get asked if we have made any significant changes since our
2 company started, and I have to laugh because it's tough not to change in 167 years, not
3 if you want to stay in business. The family farm has expanded and contracted and
4 expanded again through the decades, diversifying and simplifying and diversifying. My
5 brother and I are the sixth generation of our family to work on the family farm, and we
6 want our children to have the opportunity to do the same.

7 In high school, I hand wrapped pears in the very same packing house where I
8 work now. It looks a little different than it did way back then, but it is still recognizably the
9 same building, built in the same place the original packing house stood in the 1800s.
10 But should the tunnel project go through, I very much doubt that this place that is so
11 important to me and to my family will still exist.

12 Greene and Hemly is at ground zero for the proposed California Water "Fix". Of
13 the three current proposed intakes from the Sacramento River, each one touches us in a
14 close and specific way. The northern one takes out a pear orchard we have farmed for
15 decades and displaces a family we have been related to by sentiment if not by blood for
16 generations. The middle one takes out an apple orchard owned by our neighbors and
17 whose fruit we pack. The most southern of the three intakes is immediately to the north
18 of our office, main packing and cold storage facilities, and my parent's house, built by my
19 grandmother's grandfather. Importantly, this intake will sever the driveway leading to all
20 these buildings. (See Exhibit LAND-3, LAND-57, p. 3.)

21 Aside from the huge question of "How can Greene and Hemly stay in business if
22 our driveway is severed for ten plus years?" I wonder about other unintended
23 consequences of the tunnel project. I am concerned that dewatering will run the aquifer
24 dry and leave the packing house and cold storage plant without water to wash the fruit
25 and run defrost on the storage rooms. (See Exhibit DWR-218, p. 7 [recognizing that
26 even with the use of slurry walls, dewatering is likely to occur and DWR will still need to
27 monitor groundwater levels and offset well impacts].) Construction of the Water "Fix"
28 intakes and the associated truck trips and worker commutes will significantly increase

1 the noise at our packing and storage facilities and my parents' house. (See Exhibit
2 SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p. 23-132:5-11, 20-24; Figure 23A-04, Figure 23A-11.) In
3 addition to disrupting our rural way of life, the increases in noise will impact our ability to
4 detect problems with the equipment before something breaks. (See Exhibit
5 SWRCB 102, FEIR/EIS, p. 23-9 [current noise levels in Sacramento County range from
6 40 to 50 dBA], p. 23-121 [chart predicting up to 102 dbA for construction of intakes].)
7 We anticipate significant construction-related vibration associated with construction of
8 Intake 5. (See Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, App. 1813, p.18B-69 [Greene House
9 mitigation acknowledges potentially significant adverse construction-related vibration].)
10 Not only may construction-related vibration risk the stability of historic buildings on the
11 property, but also the constant vibration from the construction could cause problems with
12 the ever more sensitive electronics of the packing equipment. (See SWRCB-102,
13 FEIR/EIS, pp. 23-134 – 23-136 [identifying the adverse effects of groundborne vibration
14 from intake construction].) Packing house personnel will have added obstacles with
15 such a large construction project so close, such as added traffic, noise, and decreased
16 air and water quality, and general quality of life during work. (See Exhibit SWRCB-102
17 FEIR/EIS, pp. 19-210-211 [showing substantial increases in hourly traffic volumes on
18 Hwy. 160 between Hood and Courtland (CT26, CT27)].) I am concerned that the dust
19 from construction will increase pest populations in the area or degrade fruit appearance
20 so it cannot go to market. (See Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, pp. 22-286 [showing
21 dust emissions from construction], 22-304 [noting impacts from dust].) Road closures
22 and traffic will make trucking companies unwilling to deliver or pick up at our facility,
23 given the ongoing construction and the inevitable delays involved. The permanent loss
24 of orchards and fruit will inhibit our ability to enjoy future business and marketing
25 opportunities.

26 My focus is naturally enough on the impact to Greene and Hemly in particular, but
27 the tunnels will not hurt just us. The entire area in and around the intakes and everyone
28 we interact with will be affected: employees, suppliers, growers, buyers, local towns,

1 wildlife – everyone and everything. The landscape of the northern Delta will be forever
2 changed, and the very existence of its small towns put in jeopardy. Boaters and
3 waterskiers will not be able to enjoy the river. (Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, p.15-
4 472:11-13, 15-16 [impeding boat passage and navigation and resulting impacts on
5 recreation would occur during construction of the intakes].) Who wants to recreate in an
6 industrial construction zone? Wildlife, native and migratory, will be affected, disturbed by
7 both the construction and by permanent loss of habitat. What had been a rural farming
8 area will be forever changed into an industrial zone. The small town of Hood will
9 essentially disappear, swallowed under the construction on either side of it as it becomes
10 an afterthought at the dead end of a road. (See Exhibit SWRCB-102, FEIR/EIS, Figure
11 M3- 4: Sheet 2 of 15 [showing staging area adjacent to Hood].) This means the loss of
12 the market, the post office, the restaurant, and the fire station as well.

13 In farming, the physical impacts of any project are direct financial impacts to the
14 business. Loss of an orchard is loss of income, loss of flexibility, loss of economies of
15 scale, and loss of time. It is my understanding that Water “Fix” will result in salinity
16 intrusion due to the removal of Sacramento River flows. (See Exhibit II-24 Revised, p.
17 8.) If given the chance, Bartlett pear trees are economically productive for over a
18 century. But they are not immune to salt poisoning, and degradation of water quality will
19 kill them. This means not just the definite and immediate loss of one pear orchard and
20 one apple orchard, but the gradual loss of many more farther downstream, as well as
21 cherry orchards and vineyards and everything else that is grown in the Delta. The death
22 of Hood will be echoed all down the Sacramento River as other towns slowly wither
23 away with the decline of their economic base.

24 The Delta as a place is unique. The tunnels will destroy that.
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**PART 2 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
CHRISANDRA J.FLORES**

16
17 **INTRODUCTION**

18 My name is Chrisandra J. Flores and I am the Chief Deputy Agricultural
19 Commissioner/Sealer for Sacramento County. I have served as the Chief Deputy
20 Agricultural Commissioner since January 2017. I have worked in the Sacramento
21 County Agricultural Commissioner's Office for 1 ½ years. Previously, I served as the
22 Nevada County Agricultural Commissioner and Sealer of Weights and Measures. I hold
23 a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of California, Santa Barbara in
24 Environmental Studies with an emphasis in Natural Resource Management. Exhibit
25 SACO-25 contains my statement of qualifications.

26 **SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

27 Previously, Sacramento County Agricultural Commissioner, Juli Jensen,
28 submitted testimony concerning the extent and nature of agriculture and related

1 attributes throughout the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta (Delta), with a focus on
2 Sacramento County. Ms. Jensen also discussed how the California WaterFix project
3 could impact long-term agricultural production in the Sacramento County portion of the
4 Delta.¹ Relying on Figure M3-4, Sheets 1, 2, and 5 of Exhibit SWRCB-102, the County
5 Agricultural Commissioner's office determined that about 1,000 acres of Sacramento
6 County agricultural land would be permanently lost to agricultural production with
7 implementation of the WaterFix project approved by the California Department of Water
8 Resources (DWR) on July 21, 2017 (Approved Project).² Ms. Jensen estimated that this
9 loss of agricultural land would result in lost revenue of \$1.9 million per year in 2009
10 dollars, a loss of 24 jobs and lost income of \$1.9 million (in 2016 dollars).³

11 On June 18, 2018, the Hearing Team ruled that parties may submit evidence in
12 response to the DWR's Administrative Draft WaterFix Supplemental Environmental
13 Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement (EIR Supplement). I understand that
14 DWR's EIR Supplement was prepared in connection with proposed changes to the
15 California WaterFix project (Proposed Project). I have reviewed Chapter 14 and Figure
16 M3-4, Sheets 1, 2 and 4 of the EIR Supplement to determine whether DWR's Proposed
17 Project may adversely impact agricultural lands in Sacramento County.⁴ This testimony
18 highlights the potential additional permanent impacts to agricultural lands, and the local
19 economy.

20 DISCUSSION

21 The Proposed Project includes changes related to moving Reusable Tunnel
22 Material (RTM) storage areas in the vicinity of the Intermediate Forebay.⁵ These
23 changes would result in the conversion of more Important Farmland and Williamson Act
24 lands than would occur under the Approved Project. Specifically, 44 additional acres of
25

26 ¹ Exh. SACO-14.

27 ² Exh. SACO-14, p. 5.

28 ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The EIR Supplement is Exhibit SWRCB-113. EIR Supplement, Chapter 14 and Figure M3-4, Sheets 1, 2, and 4 are included as Exhibits SACO-26 and SACO-27, respectively.

⁵ SACO-26, p. 14-3:18-34.

1 Important Farmland would be permanently converted by the reconfiguration of the RTM
2 storage areas in the Proposed Project.⁶ Also, an additional 119 acres of land under
3 Williamson Act contracts would be permanently converted for the Proposed Project in
4 and around the Intermediate Forebay.⁷

5 As discussed in Ms. Jensen's testimony, the agricultural lands that would be
6 taken out of production are among the most fertile and productive agricultural lands in
7 California. The elimination of this additional acreage from agricultural production would
8 result in the loss of food production and attendant benefits for wildlife, recreation, and
9 scenic open space.

10 Permanent conversion of additional Important Farmland acreage would have
11 economic impacts as well. Relying on the lost agricultural revenue and income reduction
12 calculations of Dr. Jeffrey Michael in Exhibit SDWA-134R, p. 7, I have roughly calculated
13 the economic impacts to Sacramento County associated with the permanent conversion
14 of 44 additional acres of Important Farmland. Assuming lost revenue of \$1,949 per acre
15 in 2009 dollars (Exhibit SDWA-134R, p. 7:17-19), Sacramento County would see
16 additional lost agricultural revenue of about \$86,000 per year in 2009 dollars. Assuming
17 each million dollars of Delta agricultural output supports 12.2 jobs and \$859,000 in
18 income (Exhibit SDWA-134R, p. 7:21-24), lost production in Sacramento County would
19 eliminate one additional job and reduce income by about \$82,000 in 2016 dollars.

20 I understand that Petitioners will comply with Government Code sections 51290-
21 51295 when acquiring lands subject to Williamson Act contracts.⁸ When Williamson Act
22 land is acquired by eminent domain or in lieu of eminent domain, the contract is normally
23 terminated (Gov. Code, § 51295). When only a portion of a parcel in a Williamson Act
24 contract is removed from agricultural production, the landowner is likely to experience a
25 reduction in land value for the remaining land. Also, WaterFix activities on former
26

27 ⁶ SACO-26, p. 14-3:24-29.

28 ⁷ SACO-26, p. 14-3:29-31.

⁸ SWRCB-102, p. 14-118:11-13

1 Williamson Act lands are likely to negatively affect adjacent lands under Williamson Act
2 contracts through a reduction in land values. With permanent conversion of an
3 additional 119 acres of land in Williamson Act contracts, the Proposed Project is likely to
4 increase the risk of these adverse effects on local landowners.

5 **CONCLUSION**

6 The additional impacts to the local agricultural industry associated with the
7 permanent conversion of nearly 5 percent more Important Farmland in Sacramento
8 County than assumed in the Approved Project would exacerbate what is certain to
9 already be a severe blow to this important industry and Delta communities.

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16 WITNESS STATEMENT OF JEFF
LEATHERMAN ON BEHALF OF THE
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

17 **I. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

18 My testimony addresses the BDCP/California WaterFix's ("the Project") impacts
19 on recreation and recreational facilities throughout Sacramento County.


20 **II. IMPACT OF WATERFIX ON SACRAMENTO
COUNTY PARKS AND RECREATION**

21
22 **A. Reservoir and River Flow Levels**

23 A key issue of importance to the County of Sacramento is the impact and
24 potential harm of the Project on river flows and river levels, as changes in river levels
25 have the potential to significantly impact river-dependent recreational uses, including
26 marinas and riverside parks. The Recreation chapter of the Project Final EIR/EIS
27 ("FEIR") contains no analysis of Project effects on river levels and the resulting effect on
28

1 river-dependent recreational uses.¹ The FEIR states that “CALSIM modeling results
 2 indicate that effect on Sacramento...River flows would be less than significant. []
 3 Therefore, these are not discussed further.” (See FEIR, p. 15-64.) However, other
 4 evidence in the record indicates that various Project scenarios would result in reduced
 5 Sacramento River flows at certain times of the year, if not the entire year. (See, e.g.,
 6 FEIR Figures 6-26, 6-27, 6-30 and 6-31.)

7 *Sacramento River Flow at Freeport, Average Wet Years*




19 Utilizing the Existing Condition as the basis for comparison, a noticeable
 20 difference in Sacramento River flows at Freeport would occur between the months of
 21 April and July in average wet years.

22 ///
 23 ///
 24 ///
 25 ///
 26 ///

27 _____
 28 ¹ References to the FEIR are references to Exhibit SWRCB-102.

1 *Sacramento River Flow Downstream of North Delta Intakes, Average Wet Years*



12 **Figure 6-30**
13 **Sacramento River Flow downstream of North Delta Intakes for Alternatives 2D, 4A and 5A, Average Wet Years**

14 The adverse changes in Sacramento River flows downstream of the north delta
15 intakes under Alternative 4A appear to be particularly considerable in terms of reduced
16 cubic feet per second (cfs). Such reductions in flow levels affect recreation in a variety
17 of ways, including aesthetics, boating and viability of fish habitat. This constitutes an
18 actual harm to the public interest.

19 In Sacramento County's comments on the Draft EIR, the County noted the DEIR's
20 emphasis on reliance upon the No Action Alternative (NAA) baseline rather than existing
21 conditions baseline. We argued that use of the NAA with respect to recreation impacts
22 to reservoirs and rivers would not capture the severity of short-term (i.e., the first few
23 decades of Project operation) impacts to reservoir storage and river flow levels. The
24 NAA's incorporation of considerations such as climate change and sea level rise would
25 minimize the Project's actual recreation impacts on reservoirs and rivers. Whereas, use
26 of an existing conditions baseline would potentially disclose significant impacts to
27 recreation uses that are likely to occur in the years immediately following
28 commencement of operations unless and until the predicted future climatic influences

1 actually occur.

2 The FEIR does include brief consideration of how an existing conditions baseline
3 could alter the analysis with respect to impacts on recreation. (See FEIR, p. 15-475,
4 discussing Impact REC-6.) The FEIR acknowledges that, under Alternative 4A:

5 “recreational thresholds would be exceeded more frequently at Trinity,
6 Shasta, Oroville, Folsom and San Luis Reservoirs relative to Existing
7 Conditions. These changes represent a greater than 10% increase in the
8 frequency the recreation thresholds are exceeded at Trinity, Shasta,
9 Oroville, Folsom and San Luis Reservoirs, compared to Existing
10 Conditions.”

11 (FEIR, p. 15-475.)

12 The recreation significance threshold is a 10 percent or greater reduction in the
13 frequency of recreation facility availability, based upon reservoir levels. I am troubled by
14 this finding with respect to Folsom Reservoir, even though the FEIR attributes the
15 significant change in reservoir elevations primarily to external factors such as change in
16 demand, sea level rise and climate change. Again, those external factors would not
17 necessarily have an effect during the first decade or more of Project operations.

18 Notably, the FEIR declines to make an impact conclusion for REC-6 using the Existing
19 Conditions baseline due to an inability to isolate the precise contributions of the external
20 factors to the total differences between Existing Conditions and Alternative 4A. Rather
21 than evading a conclusion, this impact should be deemed significant to the public
22 interest in recreational opportunities.

23 FEIR Table 15-12b is instructive on this point. In the FEIR’s 82-year simulation
24 period, the loss of recreation access under existing conditions is 22 years out of 82;
25 under the NAA, it is 50 years out of 82; and under Alternative 4 it is 41 years out of 82.
26 The FEIR thus concludes Alternative 4 would be an improvement as compared to the
27 NAA. (See FEIR, p. 15-90; 15-280 to 15-281.) By failing to evaluate the Project’s
28 impacts against existing conditions, the FEIR fails to disclose that the Project will

1 substantially reduce access to recreation (by a factor of almost 2). Using the threshold
2 of significance set forth for impacts to reservoirs (see above), it would appear that the
3 Project would have a significant impact when compared to existing conditions because it
4 reduces the frequency of availability 50 percent of the time, compared to just 26 percent
5 of the time under existing conditions, a 24 percent reduction in availability.

6 In any event, using the NAA baseline, the FEIR concludes there would be three
7 additional years (out of 82) under Alternative 4A during which the reservoir levels would
8 fall below the reservoir boating threshold at the end of September. Although this
9 apparently does not trigger the FEIR's significance threshold that would indicate an
10 adverse impact on recreation occurring at the reservoir, the County of Sacramento
11 nevertheless considers this result to be harmful to the public interest in recreational
12 opportunities.

13 **B. Impacts to Cosumnes River Preserve and Stone Lakes NWR**

14 The FEIR improperly diminishes the Project's permanent and direct impact to
15 recreational opportunities at the Cosumnes River Preserve (Preserve). Alternative 4A
16 facilities include elements that would be permanently located within and adjacent to the
17 Preserve. (See FEIR, pp. 15-258, 15-467.) A Reusable Tunnel Material area would be
18 built to the north of the Preserve, southeast of the intermediate forebay. An east-west
19 permanent transmission line would be constructed adjacent to the northern boundary of
20 the Preserve along Lambert Road where California Department of Fish and Wildlife
21 manages the lands as an ecological reserve. Permanent tunnel shafts would be located
22 on the Preserve. The FEIR concludes these features and impacts are less than
23 significant. (Impact REC-1.)

24 Sacramento County disagrees with this impact conclusion. The FEIR
25 acknowledges that the Project would cause permanent surface impacts to the Preserve
26 "and would displace portions of the preserve that may be used by recreationists." (FEIR,
27 p. 15-467.) Permanent noise and visual impacts would occur from the RTM areas
28 adjacent to the Preserve. The FEIR appears to rationalize that this impact is not

1 significant because it would not result in the permanent loss or closure of a facility or
2 activity. That is not a proper measure for the impact. The value of the Preserve
3 depends in great deal upon its quiet, natural and undisturbed aural and visual character.
4 These Project features would meaningfully conflict with each of those values, thus
5 diminishing the recreational experience at the Preserve. This constitutes an
6 unreasonable harm to the public interest.

7 More accurately, the FEIR concludes that the construction-related impacts to
8 recreational opportunities and experiences such as the Preserve will be significant and
9 unavoidable (Impact REC-2), even with mitigation. (FEIR, pp. 15-267, 15-469.) The
10 Preserve is located within the construction footprint of the Project. Other recreational
11 sites, including Stone Lakes National Wildlife Refuge, are within the 1,200 to 1,400 foot
12 indirect impact area. These significant impacts are unacceptable and clearly constitute
13 harm to the public interest.

14 Similar to the permanent impacts noted above, the direct construction impacts to
15 the Preserve would introduce adverse noise, light and temporary facilities such as
16 access roads, safe haven work sites and tunnel shaft with temporary work areas for up
17 to thirteen years. Together, these impacts will cause a loss of public use of a well-
18 established recreation opportunity and experience. The impacts would occur year-
19 round.

20 The impacts to Stone Lakes NWR, although "indirect", are no less concerning. As
21 explained by the FEIR:

22
23 "The northern section of Stone Lakes NWR is adjacent to Intakes 2 and 3,
24 and the southern portion is approximately 1 mile from Intake 5.
25 Recreation does occur in the northernmost section of Stone Lakes NWR,
26 which would be east of a temporary work area and an RTM area
27 associated with Intake 2 and could cause noise and visual disturbances to
28 recreationists. Geotechnical exploration would occur along the tunnel
corridor, to the east of Stone Lakes NWR, for up to 2.5 years.

[]

1 Construction of the intakes and temporary work areas could also cause
2 noise and visual disturbances to recreationists. Construction of the
3 proposed 230 kV and 69 kV temporary transmission lines would be
4 constructed to the west and south of the North Stone Lake Unit, and could
5 cause noise and visual disturbances to visitors in the refuge for up to 1.5
6 years. Access to the refuge would be preserved, but because of the
proximity of the alignment and associated construction work areas and
borrow/spoil areas, there could be effects on wildlife viewing and
environmental education opportunities within the Stone Lakes NWR.”

7 (FEIR, p. 15-260.)

8 FEIR, Figure M3-4, Sheets 1 and 2, visually depict the close proximity of Project features
9 with Stone Lakes NWR. The Project proponents concede this significant and
10 unavoidable impact. As such, it must be regarded as equally harmful to the public
11 interest.

12 **C. Impacts To Staten Island**

13 In addition to tunneling through the Staten Island nature preserve, the Project
14 would build a tunnel shaft, a launch shaft, a vent shaft, two reusable tunnel material
15 areas and a conveyor facility, two temporary access roads, a permanent access road,
16 temporary work areas, and a temporary barge unloading facility on the island. (FEIR, pp.
17 15-258, 15-261 to 15-262.) The FEIR downplays the significant adverse effect this
18 construction will have on recreational opportunities and the visitor experience at Staten
19 Island.


20 Staten Island receives significant amounts of visitors – over 3,000 per year
21 according to staff at the Nature Conservancy, which manages conservation easements
22 on the island. Not only would recreation use be substantially diminished during the
23 years of construction, but the placement of RTM areas, shaft locations, and a permanent
24 access road would cause permanent surface impacts and would permanently displace
25 portions of the preserve that are used by recreationists. The Project would result in the
26 permanent loss of a substantial portion of the preserve. The fact that the preserve as a
27 whole would not be permanently lost or closed does not mean the significant
28

1 diminishment of the quality of the island as a nature preserve, and diminishment of the
 2 visitor experience due to the intrusion of these industrial elements, would not be a
 3 significant adverse impact on a recreation facility and the public interest.

4 **D. Impacts to the American River and Discovery Park**

5 The FEIR refers to goals and policies of the American River Parkway Plan,
 6 including policies specific to the Discovery Park Land Use area. (FEIR, p. 15-47.) The
 7 FEIR recognizes impacts to Discovery Park but fails to look at the 23 miles of river
 8 upstream from Discovery Park on the American River and how Project-related flows will
 9 impact recreation on the river. A change in flow standards will impact access to
 10 recreation on the river, parking and trails and may cause scouring of river banks, trails
 11 and access areas near the American River. The graphs included above in the
 12 discussion of river flows demonstrate that the Project will affect flow rates and levels in
 13 the Sacramento River, not far from its confluence with the American River. The
 14 variations in Folsom Reservoir storage between Alternative 4A and the existing condition
 15 (See FEIR Figures 5-45 and 5-46) further suggest the Project will have an effect on flow
 16 rates and flow levels for the American River.

17 *Figure 5-46: Folsom Lake End of September Storage*



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Figure 5-46
Folsom Lake End of September Storage for Alternatives 2D, 4A and 5A

1 industrial-type intrusions upon designated and protected natural wildlife reserves.

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8
9 BEFORE THE

10 CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD

11
12 HEARING ON THE MATTER OF
13 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES AND UNITED STATES
14 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REQUEST
FOR A CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION
15 FOR CALIFORNIA WATER FIX.

PART 2 TESTIMONY OF AMBER
VESELKA ON BEHALF OF THE
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

16
17 **I. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

18 My testimony addresses the impacts of the California WaterFix (the "Project"), as
19 revised in the Administrative Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Report
20 ("ADSEIR")¹, on recreation and recreational facilities in the Delta portion of Sacramento
21 County.

22 **II. IMPACT OF THE PROJECT ON PARKS AND RECREATION WITHIN
SACRAMENTO COUNTY**

23
24 **A. The Realignment of the North Tunnels Increases the Impacts to Stone
Lakes National Wildlife Refuge.**

25 Under the ADSEIR, the Project's North Tunnel alignment will shift to the east to
26 avoid the town of Hood, but would lie roughly 1/2 mile closer to the Stone Lakes National

27 ¹ The ADSEIR is Exhibit SWRCB 113. The ADSEIR chapters discussed in my testimony have been filed
28 herewith as follows: Chapter 3 (SACO-29), Chapter 12, pp.12-30, 12-34 (SACO-30), Chapter 15 (SACO-
31), Chapter 17 (SACO-32), and Chapter 23 (SACO-33).

1 Wildlife Refuge (SLNWR or Refuge). (See ADSEIR, p. 3-7; ADSEIR Figures 17-1, 17-3a
2 and M15-4.) Although the tunnel footprint does not cross over into SLNWR, the facility
3 will now be as close as 100-200 feet from the Refuge. (See ADSEIR, Figure M15-4.)
4 This means that construction of the tunnel, for more than ten years and with all of its
5 attendant impacts, will take place within a few hundred feet of the Refuge, which is
6 renowned for and depends upon a quiet, undisturbed environment.

7 The Project Final EIR/EIS (FEIR), SWRCB-102, concluded that the Project would
8 result in a significant and unavoidable long term-reduction in recreation opportunities
9 and experiences as a result of constructing the proposed water conveyance facilities.
10 (See FEIR, pp. 15-259 to 15-267; 15-468 to 15-469.) The FEIR acknowledged that
11 SLNWR would be located within the 1,200 to 1,400 foot "indirect impact area" associated
12 with aboveground construction of the Project. (FEIR, pp. 15-259, 15-260; 15-468.)
13 Further, the FEIR stated that "[p]otential indirect effects on recreation include access,
14 construction noise, and changes in visual character of the area surrounding the
15 recreation sites, as well as reduced wildlife-related recreational opportunities due to
16 nearby noise effects." (*ibid.*)

17 The ADSEIR describes its methodology for determining impacts as follows:
18 "The focus of this assessment is to compare the impacts on recreation
19 previously determined for the approved project with how those impacts
20 may either increase or decrease as a result of implementing the proposed
21 changes to the water conveyance facilities. This incremental analysis
22 addresses whether the proposed project, compared with the approved
23 project, would lead to any new significant environmental effects or to any
24 substantial increase in the severity of previously identified significant
25 effects."

26 (ADSEIR, p. 15-1.)

27 The ADSEIR once again recognizes that SLNWR will be located within the 1,200
28 to 1,400 foot indirect impact area of the Project, but without noting that the indirect
29 impact area will encroach further into the SLNWR. (See ADSEIR, p. 15-3; Figure M15-
30 4.) The ADSEIR concludes the changes in alignment "would not affect the previously
31 disclosed impacts on these facilities." (ADSEIR, p. 15-3.)

1 In my opinion, the change in the alignment and corresponding increase in
2 proximity of construction to the Refuge constitutes a substantial increase in the severity
3 of the previously identified significant effect on recreational opportunities and
4 experiences. (Compare location of "Impact Area" in FEIR Figure M15-4, Sheet 1 with
5 ADSEIR Figure M15-4, Sheet 1.) The setting can generally be described as follows:

6 "Stone Lakes NWR is composed of a rich mosaic of habitats that support
7 hundreds of species for both resident and migratory wildlife. The main
8 types of habitat you'll see are grasslands, riparian forest, woodland
9 savanna, freshwater lakes, freshwater sloughs, perennial wetlands,
10 seasonal wetlands, and vernal pools."

11 "The diverse habitats of Stone Lakes National Wildlife Refuge are home to
12 over 200 species of birds and numerous other fish and wildlife species.
13 The refuge is located in the heart of California's Central Valley along the
14 Pacific Flyway. When combined with neighboring natural areas, it is part of
15 a vast landscape corridor that serves as a sanctuary for many resident and
16 migratory fish, wildlife, and plant species."

17 (https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Stone_Lakes/wildlife_and_habitat/index.html)

18 Construction of the Project along the new alignment will expose a larger area of
19 the natural environs in and around the Refuge to unprecedented disturbances in the
20 form of noise (FEIR, pp. 23-122, 23-132), groundborne vibration (FEIR, pp. 23-135, 12-
21 3559, 12-3545) and visual impacts (FEIR, pp. 12-3552, 12-3566), while increasing the
22 degree of those impacts already presumed to occur within the Indirect Impact Area
23 under the FEIR.

24 For example, the FEIR concedes that construction of conveyances under the prior
25 alignment would have a significant and unavoidable noise impact on
26 "natural/recreational parcels" (12 during the day and 34 at night). (FEIR, pp. 23-123, 23-
27 132.) Although the ADSEIR does not provide similar information with respect to
28 natural/recreational parcels, it does state that an additional 97 residential parcels would
be significantly affected by noise from construction of conveyance facilities. (ADSEIR,
pp. 23-1, 23-5.) This substantial increase in the number of residential parcels that will be
exposed to a significant noise impact is indicative of what the expanded impact to
natural/recreational parcels will be, particularly given the eastward shift of the north

1 tunnel route towards SLNWR. The shift closer to the Refuge will also increase the
2 severity of threshold exceedances on sensitive receptors already presumed to be
3 affected. (See FEIR Table 23-59, at p. 23-120 [noise levels as a function of the distance
4 between "source and receiver"].)

5 The increased proximity of Project construction will have an adverse effect on
6 wildlife in the Refuge, which is a primary component of the recreational opportunity and
7 experience at SLNWR. The FEIR states that artificial lighting during construction may
8 indirectly affect certain species such as the greater and lesser sandhill crane. (See
9 FEIR, pp. 12-3552, 12-3566.) Temporary impacts on sandhill crane foraging habitat
10 would also result from geotechnical boring activities along the tunnel alignment. (FEIR,
11 pp. 12-3545, 12-3559.) Generally, construction-related "noise, dust and visual
12 disturbance caused by grading, filling, contouring and other ground disturbing operations
13 outside the project footprint" will affect multiple species found within the Refuge. (FEIR,
14 pp. 12-3551, 12-3565; see also FEIR, pp. 12-3515 [Western Pond Turtle], 12-3576
15 [Yellow Warbler], 12-3587 [Swainson's Hawk], 12-3595 [Tricolored Blackbird], 12-3603
16 [Western Burrowing Owl].)

17 Without specifically acknowledging the increased proximity of the tunnel
18 alignment to the SLNWR, the ADSEIR observes some of these indirect impacts to
19 terrestrial biological resources would remain present, although reduced to less-than-
20 significant with mitigation. (See, e.g., ADSEIR, pp. 12-30 [Greater Sandhill Crane], 12-
21 34 [Lesser Sandhill Crane].) Nevertheless, this effect upon wildlife still contributes to the
22 overall impact to recreational opportunities within the Refuge, now to a greater degree
23 with the new alignment.

24 **B. The Area of the RTM Site Immediately North of the Cosumnes River**
25 **Preserve Will Substantially Increase.**

26 Under the FEIR, three reusable tunnel material (RTM) areas were planned to be
27 located immediately north of the Cosumnes River Preserve. Specifically, these three
28 RTM areas were to be located west of Interstate 5, east of the proposed Intermediate

1 Forebay and on either side of Twin Cities Road. (See FEIR, Figure M3-4, Sheet 5.)
2 Those three RTM areas had proposed areas of 39 acres, 43 acres and 114 acres, for a
3 total of 196 acres. (See ADSEIR, p. 17-5.) Under the revised plan, those three RTM
4 areas would be "reconfigured" to create "one larger RTM area north of Twin Cities Road
5 (275 acres) and one smaller RTM area south of Twin Cities Road (77 acres)" for a total
6 area of 352 acres of RTM at a height of 10-15 feet. (*Ibid.*; see also, FEIR, p. 17-188.)
7 The change results in an increase of 156 acres of RTM area adjacent to the Cosumnes
8 River Preserve (See ADSEIR, Figure 17-3b.)

9 The "reconfiguration" and increase of the RTM areas on either side of Twin Cities
10 Road appears related to the removal of other nearby RTM areas near the Intermediate
11 Forebay (46-acre, 33-acre and 131-acre sites). (See FEIR, Figure M3-4, Sheets 2 and 4;
12 see also ADSEIR, p. 17-5.) The ADSEIR looks at the result from a Project-wide
13 perspective, concluding that the total RTM area will decrease from 2,571 down to 2,369.
14 From the on-the-ground visual perspective of the Cosumnes Preserve, however, the
15 increase is substantial and detrimental. Visitors to the Preserve, particularly in the area
16 where the Cosumnes River flows west, under I-5 and towards the Sacramento River (the
17 lower Cosumnes), will see a significantly larger RTM mound than previously analyzed in
18 the FEIR.

19 The FEIR concluded that the aesthetic impacts of the RTM areas, during
20 construction and as completed, would be significant and unavoidable, even with
21 mitigation. (See FEIR, pp. 17-197, 17-204, 17-320, 17-322). The ADSEIR concludes
22 that the incremental impact of the Project revisions would be "similar" (ADSEIR p. 17-8)
23 or "the same" (ADSEIR p. 17-11) to that of the approved project, though it is unclear
24 whether the ADSEIR is concluding the incremental impact constitutes a new significant
25 environmental effect or a substantial increase in the severity of previously identified
26 significant effects. (See ADSEIR, pp. 17-1.)

27 In my opinion, the 156-acre increase in RTM acreage, at a height of up to 15-feet,
28 directly adjacent to the Cosumnes River Preserve constitutes a substantial increase in

1 the severity of the previously identified significant effect. The topography in and around
2 the Preserve can be described as follows:

3 "[T]he western part of the watershed is characterized by lowland Delta and
4 Valley habitat types such as tule, sedge, riparian forests, and freshwater
5 marshes located adjacent to the Cosumnes River and its tributaries. The
6 lower floodplain has some of the best remaining valley oak riparian forest
7 in the Central Valley. Chinook salmon spawn in the river downstream of
8 Latrobe Falls, and native fishes rear on the seasonally flooded floodplains.
Unique terrace and mudflow vernal pool systems are found embedded
within annual grasslands on the eastern edge of Sacramento and San
Joaquin Counties. Agricultural land, particularly irrigated agriculture, is
concentrated on the fertile upland valley soils of the valley floor in the lower
watershed."

9 (2008 Cosumnes River Preserve Management Plan, Section 2.1.2, p. 2-11.)

10 The addition of 156 acres of RTM mounds will be a substantial artificial
11 change to the otherwise characteristically flat, natural Delta landscape. It will
12 constitute an incrementally significant unnatural addition to the surrounding
13 scenery. This is a substantial, adverse impact to the public interest, both in terms
14 of the aesthetic and recreational value of viewing a natural landscape in and
15 around the Preserve.

16 **C. The Expansion of the Shaft Facility Area and the New Safe
17 Haven Work Area on Staten Island Constitute Significant
Impacts.**

18 Under the FEIR, the "approved" Project proposed to locate two shaft sites on
19 Staten Island. (See FEIR, Figure M3-4, Sheets 6 and 7.) During construction, the shaft
20 sites would be used for retrieval, launch and ventilation. (See FEIR, p. 17-189.)
21 Following construction, they would be converted to permanent access shaft sites. (See
22 *ibid.*; see also, e.g., FEIR Figure 17-80.) The FEIR concluded that construction and
23 permanent effects of the shaft sites would contribute to a significant and unavoidable
24 aesthetic impact on Alternatives 4 and 4A. (See FEIR, pp. 17-197, 17-208, 17-209, 17-
25 320, 17-322.)

26 The northernmost shaft site on Staten Island was originally proposed to be 10
27 acres. Under the revised Project, it will be a 39-acre site, for an increase of 29 acres.
28

1 (See ADSEIR, p. 17-6.) The revised Project would also add a 10-acre "safe haven work
2 area" to Staten Island, for a total of three such areas. (See *ibid.*; see also, FEIR, p. 17-
3 190.)

4 Staten Island supports agricultural uses and provides natural habitat for various
5 species. It is part of the Cosumnes River Preserve and is a recreational location for
6 hiking and bird watching. The terrain is primarily flat and undeveloped. Although it is far
7 from clear what the ADSEIR's impact conclusion is with respect to the alteration in
8 existing visual quality or character during construction of conveyance facilities (ADSEIR,
9 pp. 17-8, 17-11 & 17-12), the addition of 29 acres to the shaft site, along with a new safe
10 haven work area, constitutes a substantial increase in the severity of the previously
11 identified significant visual impact on Staten Island, and upon the public interest.

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10 BEFORE THE
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12 HEARING ON THE MATTER OF
13 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES AND UNITED STATES
14 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REQUEST
FOR A CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION
15 FOR CALIFORNIA WATER FIX.

**PART TWP TESTIMONY OF REZA
MOGHISSI, PE, ON BEHALF OF THE
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**

16
17 **I. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

18 I, Reza Moghissi, submit this testimony on behalf of Sacramento County in Part 2
19 of the California WaterFix petition for change proceeding pending before the State Water
20 Resources Control Board. Based upon my review of the Final Recirculated EIR/EIS
21 ("FEIR") for the BDCP/California WaterFix and other relevant materials, I anticipate that
22 the construction and operation of the California WaterFix (FEIR Alternative 4A) ("the
23 Project") will significantly and adversely change the nature of travel in the Delta. Heavy
24 construction traffic will be introduced for over ten years into a setting that is accustomed
25 to a rural way of life. Not only will residents and visitors be affected by traveling with a
26 heavy increase in construction traffic, but pavement conditions in the Delta will
27 deteriorate to a point of disrepair. Construction impacts to pavement condition will be
28 significant and roadways will need to be reconstructed to current structural standards.

1 The FEIR only identifies 16 Sacramento County roadways within the study area
2 as potential construction routes. In addition to the roadways identified in the analysis,
3 there are 14 roadway segments that are either adjacent to the identified routes or are
4 close to the project construction sites. These roadway segments will be impacted either
5 directly or indirectly by the construction activity associated with the Project. Those
6 roadway segments are shown in Exhibit SACO-22. Based on my experience, truck
7 drivers have the tendency to use the shortest and easiest route every time, regardless of
8 designated construction routes. They pay for their fuel and many get paid by the load.

9 **II. TRAFFIC IMPACTS ON DELTA WAY OF LIFE**

10 The following Sacramento County Delta roads will experience dramatic and
11 unprecedented increases in traffic levels during the Project's 10+ year construction
12 period: Hood Franklin Road, Lambert Road, Franklin Boulevard, Twin Cities Road,
13 Sutter Slough Bridge Road, River Road and Walnut Grove Road.¹ Each of these roads
14 will experience significant hourly volume increases during construction, even though
15 level of service (LOS) calculations may show acceptable operations. (See, e.g., FEIR,
16 Table 19-25, p.19-215; Attachment E to Appendix 19A.)

17 For example, as shown in Figure 1, during the peak traffic times, Hood Franklin
18 Road, from State Route 160 (River Road) to Interstate-5, will experience a five-fold
19 increase in traffic volumes (approx. 153 vehicles/hour increased to approx. 773
20 vehicles/hour). (See FEIR, Appendix 19A, Table 9 and Attachment E.)

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27 _____
28 ^{1/} The corresponding road segment ID's for these roads in the FEIR are SC 02, SC 03, SC 04, SC 05, SC 06, SC 07,
SC 08, SC 10 and SC 11.

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


Figure 1. Traffic Volumes, Hood Franklin Road from Hwy 160 to I-5

Similarly, as shown in Figure 2, during peak traffic hours, Sutter Slough Bridge Road, from the Sacramento/Yolo County line to Paintersville Bridge, will see hourly trips drastically increase from a mere 140 up to 760. (See FEIR, Appendix 19A, Table 9 and Attachment E.) Although the resulting increases from Project construction trips may not technically trigger the County's ordinary LOS significance threshold, the effect on local residents will be substantial, adverse and will alter their local travel patterns, routes and timing.

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ID	Roadway	Segment	
		From	To
SC 08	Sutter Slough Bridge Rd	Sacramento Co./Yolo Co. Line	Paintersville Bridge




Figure 2. Traffic Volumes
Sutter Slough Bridge Rd, Sac./Yolo Co. to Paintersville Bridge

The expected traffic volume increases for these Sacramento County Delta roads is not marginal. The increases will be more than double or triple. The increases are by an order of magnitude of four or even five. (See FEIR, Appendix. 19A, Table 9 and Attachment E.) These lightly traveled rural roads will be inundated with construction-related traffic volumes that are more characteristic of urban road traffic volumes. Not only will this force local residents, business owners, employees and suppliers to alter their routes and schedules, but it will also alter the quiet character of the area for more than ten years. The change constitutes much more than an inconvenience. Trip times for residents, business owners, employees and suppliers will inevitably and substantially change such that they will need to alter their practices and expectations. Moreover, the FEIR acknowledges that there will be detours and road closures, which will even more severely hinder the expectations of local drivers.

III. TRAFFIC OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY

The FEIR analyzes traffic operations of roadway segments using a methodology described in the Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) and the hourly traffic volume thresholds. The HCM methodology is generally used for the Level of Service (LOS) analysis of urban streets and highways where the roadway characteristics are very

1 different from the roads in the Delta. The physical characteristics of Delta roads in
2 Sacramento County consist of generally narrow pavement widths, limited or nonexistent
3 shoulders, and often drainage ditches on one or both sides of the roadway. The road
4 segments mentioned in the study carry a combination of cars, trucks, and wide-slow-
5 moving agricultural equipment, especially during the growing season. The above
6 conditions create an environment that is quite different from an urban setting. This
7 environment directly affects the speed of traffic and the capacity of the roadway.
8 Therefore, it is highly doubtful whether the traffic operation analysis included in the FEIR
9 realistically forecasts the level of service during Project construction for Sacramento
10 County roads in the study area. It is highly expected that the Project's impacts will be
11 greater than what has been determined by the Project Roadway Traffic Operations
12 Analysis.

13 While roadway capacity is one measure of operations on a roadway, the nature of
14 the construction traffic will also affect traffic flow. The Project will consist of significant
15 amounts of heavy equipment on roads that do not normally experience this type of
16 traffic. It is not clear that passenger car equivalents (PCE's) for construction equipment
17 were taken into consideration with this volume analysis. The length of construction and
18 nature of traffic (heavy vehicles) should be taken into consideration in assessing the
19 nature and extent of the Project's impacts. The increase in heavy vehicle traffic volumes
20 due to Project construction will be an unreasonable effect on the public interest of Delta
21 residents, including economic and commercial interests, and Delta visitors.

22 IV. MITIGATION FOR LOS IMPACTS

23 The FEIR does not propose mitigation to reduce the LOS impacts of the Project
24 on County road segments because it fails to acknowledge the actual severity of such
25 impacts to the County roads that will be utilized for construction routes.² In any event,
26

27 ² Notwithstanding the FEIR's impact conclusions with respect to traffic volumes on Sacramento County roads, Table
28 23 in FEIR Appendix 19A (pp. 193-194) appears to require implementation of MM TRANS-1b for five identified
Sacramento County Road segments. This may be as mitigation for pavement deterioration impacts.

1 the FEIR's mitigation for impacted road segments is not effective to remedy the impacts
2 that will occur to Sacramento County roads, or other similarly impacted Delta roads.

3 Mitigation Measure TRANS-1b (MM TRANS-1b) calls for limiting construction
4 activities so that construction traffic remains below acceptable LOS levels on roadways.
5 (See FEIR, p. 19-221.) In the County's experience, more than likely it will not be efficient
6 or feasible for construction-related traffic to be limited or confined to designated or
7 approved routes. Moreover, it is almost impossible to enforce. Truck traffic during
8 construction projects is difficult to control. Truckers do not stay on designated routes, cut
9 across islands on peripheral roads, ignore bridge weight limits, and tear up intersections
10 by making unauthorized U-turns.

11 It is unclear how MM TRANS-1b would be achieved. Will someone perform
12 hourly volume counts on various roadways in the study area and shut down construction
13 traffic if LOS capacities are reached? Petitioners should require that the transportation
14 management plan specify short- and long-term roadway use and include enforcement
15 provisions. However, due to the significant uncertainties in the feasibility of this
16 mitigation, I am skeptical that it would be effective to mitigate impacts below a level of
17 significance.

18 Mitigation Measure TRANS-1c (MM TRANS-1c) calls for making "good faith
19 efforts" to enter into mitigation agreements to enhance capacity on congested roadway
20 segments. This measure is indefinite and illusory. It is unclear what constitutes a "good
21 faith effort". MM TRANS-1c potentially places more of a burden and responsibility on
22 local jurisdictions to remedy a problem that the Petitioners are causing. Also, more
23 information is needed about the specific capacity enhancement projects that would be
24 required to mitigate impacts. We do not know what the expected location and extent of
25 these improvements would be. It does not appear that the impacts of capacity
26 enhancement have been studied. If roads must be widened to mitigate Project traffic,
27 homes, businesses and/or agricultural land would likely be lost. Are the needed
28 improvements included in an existing program of planned improvements? If so, what is

1 the funding status of that program? In my opinion, making a good faith effort or paying a
2 fair share is not sufficient mitigation if there is no evidence that mitigation will actually
3 result. Accordingly, I do not view MM TRANS-1c as a clear solution to the impacts that
4 will occur to County roads.

5 **V. IMPACT OF CONSTRUCTION TRAFFIC ON SAFETY**
6 **AND EMERGENCY SERVICES**

7 The Project will likely impact the safety of Delta citizens due to an increase in
8 roadway safety hazards, including interference with emergency routes during
9 construction on heavily congested highways including I-5, 1-80, SR 50, SR 99, SR 160,
10 and low capacity roadways including Lambert Road, Grant Line Road, Hood Franklin
11 Road and River Road. (See FEIR, Impact TRANS-3 - *Increased Safety Hazards and*
12 *Interference with Emergency Routes*, p. 19-231.) Project construction traffic will greatly
13 increase an already lengthy law enforcement response time to the residents of the river
14 Delta communities. Current emergency law enforcement response times to the
15 communities of Locke, Hood, Isleton, and the many recreational sloughs and islands are
16 in excess of 25 minutes. Based on the Sheriff Department's experience with prior
17 roadway and bridge construction projects in that area, the Project impact of roadway
18 hazards, traffic control, and interference will increase this response time to more than 60
19 minutes.

20 The only mitigation noted (MM TRANS-1c) is a "good faith effort" to enter into
21 agreements to enhance capacity of affected roads. As I previously noted, this measure
22 is illusory, indefinite and does not guarantee that mitigation or improvement will occur.
23 Moreover, the impact discussion indicates that MM TRANS-1c will not reduce the
24 severity of the impact to a less than significant level. (See FEIR, p. 19-231) This is
25 unacceptable and will adversely affect law enforcement response and community safety
26 for a period of 9 to 12 years.

27
28

1 **VI. IMPACTS TO THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF COUNTY ROADS**

2 The FEIR acknowledges that Project construction traffic is likely to substantially
3 degrade some Delta roads within Sacramento County. However, the FEIR's analysis of
4 construction impacts does not address the full scope of the Project's impacts to County
5 roads, and mitigation is not adequate to avoid or substantially lessen significant impacts.

6 During construction of the proposed Project, various materials would be
7 transported to and from the construction area in heavy trucks. The immediate impacts of
8 such heavy truck traffic on the Delta roads will be the crumbling of the roadway surface
9 to a point it would be impassable or very hazardous for vehicular traffic. It is important to
10 address the current reality of the roadway conditions in the Delta area within Sacramento
11 County. The FEIR reflects that a majority (9 out of 16) of the Sacramento County roads
12 within the study area are currently below a PCI threshold rating of 55. (See FEIR Table
13 19-26, at p. 19-227; FEIR Appendix 19A, Table 10 at pp. 75-76.) In Sacramento County,
14 the calculated Pavement Conditions Index (PCI) is used as a metric to describe the
15 *surface* condition of the roadway. The PCI does not take into account the pavement
16 structure or pavement structural section strength. As such, a PCI 55 for an engineered
17 roadway has vastly different capacity to withstand truck loading impacts compared to a
18 PCI 55 for a rural farm road built on poor soil with no engineered structural section. The
19 FEIR does not make this important distinction and consequently, the impacts of the
20 construction activity in the study area will be far worse than projected by the report.

21 Because of sub-surface and foundational/structural issues with Delta roads, even
22 the roads deemed by the FEIR to be in "acceptable" condition are vulnerable to
23 pavement deterioration impacts from construction trucks and related traffic. The FEIR
24 treats roads in baseline "acceptable" condition as not being susceptible to a significant
25 impact. (See, e.g., Lambert Road [SC 03], Twin Cities Road [SC 06] and Walnut Grove
26 Road/River Road [SC 11] at p. 19-227.) Even a road that currently exists at a PCI above
27 55 will be significantly damaged by the substantial number of truck trips and other
28 construction-related trips for the Project. Any construction traffic that will be added to

1 either “acceptable” or “deficient” types of roadways, due to the nature of heavy loads, is
 2 expected to break down pavement conditions significantly. The FEIR incorrectly
 3 concludes those “acceptable” roads will not be significantly impacted.

4 Due to the age and condition of the infrastructure in the Delta, roads not built to
 5 current standards will deteriorate more rapidly as a result of the existing geologic and
 6 hydrologic conditions in the area (roadways constructed on levees and on peat or in tidal
 7 areas), heavy construction traffic volumes and the nature of that traffic (heavily laden
 8 trucks). Consequently, the Project will result in significant deterioration of roadways that
 9 are presently in “acceptable” condition, in addition to those identified in the FEIR as
 10 currently deficient. Road deterioration will result in additional traffic delays, damage to
 11 vehicles, and increased safety hazards.

12 The FEIR surprisingly concludes that the pavement condition of certain baseline
 13 “acceptable” road segments will not be significantly impacted even though substantial
 14 amounts of construction-related trips will be added. For example, the FEIR shows
 15 Lambert Road, between State Route 160 (River Road) and Herzog Road, as currently in
 16 acceptable condition. However, hourly trips will exorbitantly increase from a mere
 17 35/hour to 655/hour, as shown in Figure 3. (See FEIR, Appendix 19A, Table 9, at p. 67.)

ID	Roadway	Segment	
		From	To
SC 03	Lambert Rd	SR 160 (River Rd)	Herzog Rd




Figure 3. Traffic Volumes
Lambert Rd., SR 160 to Herzog Rd.

1 This massive increase in construction-related trips will undoubtedly have a
2 significant and detrimental impact on the pavement condition of Lambert Road along this
3 segment.

4 Similarly, the FEIR shows Twin Cities Road, between River Road and Interstate
5 5, as being in “acceptable” condition. (See FEIR, Table 19-26, at p. 19-227.) However,
6 as shown in Figure 4, with the Project, hourly trips will increase from 263 to 668. (See
7 FEIR, Appendix. 19A, Table 9, at p. 67.) The addition of approximately 400 trips per
8 hour to this road segment will more than likely degrade the pavement condition to a level
9 below PCI 55.

ID	Roadway	Segment	
		From	To
SC 06	Twin Cities Rd	River Rd	I-5




Figure 4. Traffic Volumes
Twin Cities Rd., River Rd. to I-5

22 For certain other road segments,³ the FEIR indicates that there will be “no
23 construction trips added to [the] roadway.” (See FEIR, Table 19-26, p. 19-227.)
24 However, that is not technically accurate. For each of these segments, 45 hourly trips
25 will be added due to construction-related traffic. (See FEIR Appendix. 19A, Table 9, pp.
26 67-68.) These additional trips are not nominal. The additional increment will significantly
27 impact these roads, particularly in consideration of the additional truck trips.

³/ In particular, SC 07, SC 09 and SC 12 through SC 16.

1 For each of these reasons, Petitioners do not fairly acknowledge the true extent of
2 damage that construction-related trips will have on the County's Delta roads. Although
3 many of the Delta roads are currently in poor condition, the Project construction trips will
4 substantially accelerate the deterioration of the roads. Moreover, the introduction of
5 Project construction trips will necessitate the immediate reconstruction of many of these
6 roads, which are not currently constructed to support a Project of this scale and
7 magnitude. Some Delta roads that could otherwise support ordinary traffic and trip
8 levels for another decade would not last for more than a few weeks if the Project is
9 started.

10 **VII. MITIGATION FOR PAVEMENT CONDITION IMPACTS IS INSUFFICIENT**

11 Mitigation Measures TRANS-2a and TRANS-2b call for prohibiting or limiting
12 construction activity on existing physically deficient roadway segments, if feasible. As
13 discussed above with respect to MM TRANS-1b, these approaches are probably not
14 feasible. Most of the Delta roads planned (or unplanned) for use by the contractors will
15 be physically deficient after a few weeks of construction trips. It would be infeasible to
16 prohibit construction trips on these roads because that would have the effect of grinding
17 construction progress to a halt.

18 Mitigation Measure TRANS-2c (MM TRANS-2c) addresses the effect of
19 construction traffic on roadways that currently have unacceptable pavement conditions
20 by improving the physical condition of affected roadways. MM TRANS-2c, however, is
21 too narrowly focused to adequately mitigate the Project's impacts to County roads
22 because the Measure, and FEIR generally, does not acknowledge that more than just
23 five County road segments will be subject to significant pavement deterioration. As
24 shown in FEIR Table 19-5 - *Existing Pavement Conditions in the Study Area*, the
25 pavement conditions on most of the Sacramento County roadway segments in the study
26 area are unacceptable. (FEIR, pp. 19-21 to 19-22.) Furthermore, the few that are
27 classified as acceptable have a Pavement Condition Index (PCI) rating on the border of
28 unacceptable. Adding construction traffic to these roadways will make them deteriorate

1 to unusable conditions. Any roads used, whether they have an existing pavement
2 deficiency or not, are expected to deteriorate due to the nature of construction activity.
3 Roadways with a current PCI slightly higher than 56 out of 100 may be considered
4 "acceptable," but they are very close to becoming unacceptable. The introduction of
5 significant amounts of heavy construction traffic will quickly cause them to deteriorate
6 into the unacceptable category. MM TRANS-2c fails to account for or mitigate significant
7 impacts to these roadway segments. All roadways that will carry construction traffic will
8 be affected, including side roads. The Petitioners' failure to account for these additional
9 significant impacts constitutes a significant adverse effect on the public interest.

10 The Petitioners commit to restoring certain roadways "to pre-construction
11 condition or better" at the end of the construction period. This commitment is both
12 unclear and impractical. This mitigation measure requires restoration of roads to their
13 "pre-construction" condition. For roads that are presently deficient, or on the verge of
14 being deficient, the measure would require the Proponents to ultimately restore these
15 roads to an "unacceptable" condition. Because the Project does not commit to delivering
16 acceptable roadways back to the people of Sacramento County at the conclusion of the
17 work, the Project results in actual harm to the public interest.

18 Similarly, the Project fails to require routine maintenance on substandard or
19 damaged roadways throughout construction activities to ensure that roads remain safe
20 and in acceptable condition for other users, including emergency vehicles.

21 **VIII. IMPACTS TO SIDE ROADS**

22 The FEIR identifies roadway segments for impact study based on the likelihood
23 that they would be utilized for construction-related activities. The analysis does not
24 evaluate the impacts to side roadways that may be used during construction. A large
25 percentage of sub-contract goods/supply haulers do not adhere to prescribed hauling
26 routes, primarily due to limited oversight and enforcement. For example, Herzog Road,
27 Varden Road, Russell Road, and Terminous Road will be negatively affected because
28 they are adjacent to the FEIR's study segments and will provide an accessible




Table 19-1. Roadway Study Segments

Segment ID	Segment	From	To
SC 01	Freeport Bridge	River Road	SR 160
SC 02	Hood Franklin Road	SR 160	I-5
SC 03	Lambert Road	SR 160	Herzog Road
SC 04	Lambert Road	Herzog Road	Franklin Blvd.
SC 05	Franklin Blvd.	Lambert Road	Twin Cities Road
SC 06	Twin Cities Road	River Road	I-5
SC 07	Twin Cities Road	I-5	Franklin Blvd.
SC 08	Sutter Slough Bridge Rd	Sac. Co./Yolo Co.	Paintersville Bridge
SC 09	River Road	Paintersville Bridge	Twin Cities Road
SC 10	River Road	Twin Cities Road	Walnut Grove Bridge
SC 11	Walnut Grove/River Rd	Walnut Grove Bridge	Sac. Co./S.J. Co.
SC 12	Isleton Road	River Road	1.5 miles w/o Isleton Rd.
SC 13	Race Track/Tyler Island Rd	Walnut Grove Road	Southern end of Tyler Isl.
SC 14	Tyler Island Road	Southern end of Tyler Isl.	SR 160
SC 15	Jackson Slough Road	Isleton City Limits	SR 12
SC 16	Jackson Slough Road	Grannan Island	SR 12

Roadways Not Listed in the Study Area

Segment	From	To
Consumnes River Blvd.	I-5	SR 160/Freeport Blvd.
Hood Franklin Road	I-5	Franklin Blvd.
Franklin Blvd.	Hood Franklin Road	Lambert Road
Lambert Road	Franklin Blvd.	Carrol Road
Carrol Road	Lambert Road	Eschinger Road
Eschinger Road	Lambert Road	SR 160
Dierssen Road	Franklin Blvd.	to the west end
Russell Road	Lambert Road	River Road
Herzog Road	Lambert Road	Vorden Road
Vorden Road	Herzog Road	Sac. Co./S.J. Co.
Isleton Road	Isleton Bridge	Walnut Grove Road
Tyler Island Road	Tyler Island Bridge Road	Race Track Road
Terminus Road	Hwy 12	Jackson Slough Road
Grannan Island Road	SR 12	SR 160

Sources: Plan Map, ICF 2010; Areas of Additional Analysis, ICF 2012; Roadway Alignment, PH 2, Febr 2010.

Figure 19-2a
Roadway Segments

Sacramento County Affected Roadways Segments




County of Sacramento comments to Bay Delta Conservation Plan/California WaterFix

Department of Transportation



Physical Characteristics of Delta Roads



- Narrow pavement width, limited or nonexistent shoulder, often drainage ditches on one or both sides of the roadway.
- Built on levees that were constructed from native soils.
- Many roads that are not on the levees are at or below sea level. The ground moves with the tides.
- Roadways are old and in poor condition.
- Bridges are at capacity and too narrow for constant truck traffic.

Traffic Operation Analysis

- The roadway segment traffic analysis does not fully consider the physical characteristics of Delta roads in determining the Level of Service (LOS) during project construction.
- The Traffic Operations Analysis has left out an intersection-level analysis citing insufficient information regarding construction traffic patterns.
- Intersection operations in the study area within the commercial centers of the Delta and at the bridges, especially the draw bridges, pose a real concern during construction of the project.
- It is highly expected that the project's impacts will be greater than what has been determined by the Project Roadway Traffic Operations Analysis.

Physical Impacts of Construction

- Pavement Conditions Index (PCI) is used as a metric to describe the surface condition of the roadway.
- The analysis deems existing pavement conditions as acceptable if the PCI is greater than 55.
- The PCI does not take into account the pavement structure or pavement structural section strength.
- A PCI 55 for an engineered roadway has a vastly different capacity to withstand truck loading impacts compared to a PCI 55 for a rural farm road built on poor soil with no engineered structural section.


Existing Pavement Condition

The Pavement Condition Index (PCI) is expressed as a number from 0 to 100, with 100 being new pavement. A PCI of 55 represents the threshold between “Fair/Good” condition. A PCI greater than 70 is considered “Very Good”.

Table 19-5. Existing Pavement Conditions in the Study Area

Segment ID	Segment	From	To	Condition	Extent of	
					Deficiency	Notes
SC 01	Freeport Bridge	River Road	SR 160	N/A		Bridge
SC 02	Hood Franklin Road	SR 160	I-5	Deficient	Majority	PCI 45 to 67
SC 03	Lambert Road	SR 160	Herzog Road	Acceptable		PCI 56
SC 04	Lambert Road	Herzog Road	Franklin Blvd.	Deficient	Majority	PCI 35 to 59
SC 05	Franklin Blvd.	Lambert Road	Twin Cities Road	Deficient	All	PCI 32
SC 06	Twin Cities Road	River Road	I-5	Acceptable		PCI 84
SC 07	Twin Cities Road	I-5	Franklin Blvd.	Deficient	All	PCI 45
SC 08	Sutter Slough Bridge Rd	Sac. Co./Yolo Co.	Paintersville Bridge	Deficient	All	PCI 24
SC 09	River Road	Paintersville Bridge	Twin Cities Road	Deficient	Majority	PCI 43 to 54
SC 10	River Road	Twin Cities Road	Walnut Grove Bridge	Deficient	Minority	PCI 48 to 64
SC 11	Walnut Grove/River Rd	Walnut Grove Bridge	Sac. Co./SJ Co.	Acceptable		PCI 64
SC 12	Isleton Road	River Road	1.5 miles w/o Isleton Rd.	Acceptable		PCI 85
SC 13	Race Track/Tyler Island Rd	Walnut Grove Road	Southern end of Tyler Isl.	Deficient	Minority	PCI 36 to 94
SC 14	Tyler Island Road	Southern end of Tyler Isl.	SR 160	Deficient	All	PCI 20 to 36
SC 15	Jackson Slough Road	Isleton City Limits	SR 12	Acceptable		PCI 86 to 94
SC 16	Jackson Slough Road	Brannan Island	SR 12	Acceptable		PCI 86

Roadways Not Considered For Impacts



Roadways Not Considered For Impacts

Consumnes River Blvd.	I-5	SR-160/Freeport Blvd.
Hood Franklin Road	I-5	Franklin Blvd.
Franklin Blvd.	Hood Franklin Road	Lambert Road
Lambert Road	Franklin Blvd.	Carrol Road
Carrol Road	Lambert Road	Eschinger Road
Eschinger Road	Lambert Road	SR-160
Dierssen Road	Franklin Blvd.	to the west end
Russell Road	Lambert Road	River Road
Herzog Road	Lambert Road	Vorden Road
Vorden Road	Herzog Road	Sac. Co./SJ Co.
Isleton Road	Isleton Bridge	Walnut Grove Road
Tyler Island Road	Tyler Island Bridge Road	Race Track Road
Terminus Road	Hwy 12	Jackson Slough Road
Brannon Island Road	SR-12	SR-160

Roadways Not Considered For Impacts




Figure 19-2a
Roadway Segments

Sacramento County Affected Roadways Segments

Roadway Impacts




Truck traffic during construction projects is difficult to control. Truckers do not stay on designated routes, cut across islands on peripheral roads, ignore bridge weight limits, and tear up intersections by making unauthorized U-turns.

Traffic Impacts on Delta Way of Life

County Roads such as Hood Franklin, Lambert, Twin Cities, Sutter Slough, River, Walnut Grove, Isleton and Race Track will all experience significant hourly volume increases during construction.

Current emergency response times to communities of Locke, Hood, Isleton and many recreational sloughs and islands will increase from 25 minutes to more than 60 minutes.



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15 Central Delta Water Agency, Lafayette Ranch,
16 Heritage Lands, Mark Bachetti Farms
17 and Rudy Mussi Investments L.P.

18 [ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON FOLLOWING PAGE]

19 STATE OF CALIFORNIA

20 STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD

21 Hearing in the Matter of California
22 Department of Water Resources and
23 United States Department of the Interior,
24 Bureau of Reclamation Request for a
25 Change in Point of Diversion for
26 California Water Fix

27 **DR. JEFFREY MICHAEL'S WRITTEN
28 SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY, PART 2
CASE IN CHIEF**

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1 **I. Introduction**

2 I am Executive Director of the Center for Business and Policy Research and Professor of
3 Public Policy at the University of the Pacific. Economic and policy issues in the Delta have
4 been a major focus of my research and the Center's work since I came to Pacific in 2008, both
5 because of its importance to the regional economy that is the Center's focus and its fit with my
6 own educational and research background in agricultural and resource economics and
7 economic development. I received my Ph.D. in Economics from North Carolina State
8 University in 1999, where I received a National Needs Fellowship from the U.S. Department of
9 Agriculture to support my Ph.D. studies in the economics of natural resource management. My
10 dissertation was one of the first empirical studies of the economic effects of the Endangered
11 Species Act on rural economies and resource management decisions by private landowners. I
12 have published in scholarly journals economics, law, and environmental science on relevant
13 topics including the economic impacts of sea-level rise and habitat conservation. My Delta
14 research experience includes being Principal Investigator of the Delta Protection Commission's
15 Economic Sustainability Plan in 2011-12, and benefit-cost studies of the Bay Delta
16 Conservation Plan ("BDCP") tunnels in 2012, and the WaterFix in 2016.

17
18 In Part 1 of this hearing, I testified about the economic impacts of WaterFix on Delta
19 agriculture as a result of degraded water quality and land loss. In Part 1, I also discussed how
20 building WaterFix would negatively affect investment in Delta levees, and the economic
21 effects of increased flood risk on aspects of the Delta economy such as transportation. While
22 several aspects of these topics cross-over into Part 2 issues, I will not add any further testimony
23 on these topics. Part 2 of the hearing includes the questions of whether the proposed WaterFix
24 project is in the public interest, and whether WaterFix operations will have an unreasonable
25 effect on environmental resources. Economic and financial analysis is fundamental to
26 evaluating both of these questions, and my comments will focus on three primary issues. First,
27 I will discuss some negative local economic impacts from the environmental effects of
28 constructing and operating the WaterFix with a focus on small businesses that serve the Delta

1 recreation economy and shape community character. The second topic is benefit-cost analysis,
2 a long established professional standard that plays a critical role in determining whether public
3 investments in infrastructure, including water infrastructure, are in the public interest. The
4 third topic, financial feasibility analysis, is closely related to benefit-cost analysis, but is more
5 narrowly focused on the benefits and costs to project beneficiaries, and the specifics of a
6 financial plan such as the allocation of costs across beneficiaries. In the case of the California
7 Department of Water Resources (DWR) and United States Bureau of Reclamation's
8 (collectively, Petitioners) petition to change and add the points of diversion in their water rights
9 (Petition), financial analysis is critical to determining the feasibility of any constraints to
10 project operations that are proposed.

11 Despite the fundamental role of benefit-cost and financial feasibility analysis to
12 evaluating WaterFix, Petitioners have not completed these analyses and have not submitted any
13 economic and financial evidence in support of their Petition. The absence of this information
14 violates the agencies' own planning guidelines, and their Petition is clearly incomplete without
15 it. My testimony will demonstrate that the WaterFix project, as proposed in this petition and
16 described in the EIR, badly fails the tests of benefit-cost analysis and financial feasibility.

18 **II. Waterfix Will Adversely Impact Small Businesses In The Delta That Serve The** 19 **Recreation Economy And Local Residents.**

20 The Delta Protection Commission Economic Sustainability Plan estimated that the
21 Delta attracted 12 million visitor days per year, directly or indirectly supporting 3,000 jobs and
22 \$329 million in annual economic activity in the five Delta counties. Water based recreation is
23 the primary attraction, but scenic drives and land based visits to historic, natural and cultural
24 attractions is also important – especially along the highway 160 corridor which will be severely
25 impacted by construction of the WaterFix intakes. Construction of the WaterFix will include
26 significant disruptions to popular waterways through barge traffic and loading zones,
27 construction of intakes, and disrupt traffic and tourist attractions along highway 160, 4, 12 and
28 local roads. Three characteristics of the WaterFix construction will result in more serious and

1 long-term economic losses than those resulting from a typical construction project. First, the
2 construction period is exceptionally long with active construction disrupting traffic and
3 business for more than a decade. Second, Delta recreation businesses are predominantly small
4 independent enterprises that typically have limited resources to endure an extended loss in
5 business. Third, the multi-layered regulatory environment in the Delta, described in Chapter
6 10 of the ESP, makes new business investment after construction is over extremely
7 challenging, if not prohibitively costly. For example, in addition to California's typically
8 burdensome entitlement process, business development in the Delta is subject to additional
9 layers of review by the Delta Protection Commission and Delta Stewardship Council as a
10 covered action and could trigger reviews from additional federal agencies. Thus, the economy
11 in the primary zone of the Delta is less resilient to construction-related disruption than most
12 areas.

13 All of these factors combine to make permanent economic damage from WaterFix
14 construction much more likely than in most public works projects. Additional long-run
15 damage to the recreation economy would occur if WaterFix has negative environmental
16 impacts, such as degraded water quality, reduced fish populations, and increased algal blooms.

17 The WaterFix is an enormous construction project estimated to cost \$17 billion. A
18 construction project of this size will undoubtedly stimulate economic activity and create many
19 jobs in areas nearby the construction project. Petitioners have emphasized these positive
20 economic impacts that would occur in Delta counties during an estimated 15 year construction
21 period.¹ However, it is important to recognize that these positive effects may not accrue to the
22 small businesses that predominate in the primary zone of the Delta which primarily serves the
23 local agriculture and recreation industries. While a retail or restaurant business might be able
24 to offset some lost sales to recreationists and tourists through new sales to WaterFix workers,
25

26
27 ¹ [http://baydeltaconservationplan.com/Libraries/Dynamic_Document_Library/Final_EIR-EIS_Appendix_16A -
Regional Economic Impacts of Water Conveyance Facility Construction.sflb.ashx](http://baydeltaconservationplan.com/Libraries/Dynamic_Document_Library/Final_EIR-EIS_Appendix_16A_-_Regional_Economic_Impacts_of_Water_Conveyance_Facility_Construction.sflb.ashx)
28

1 this is highly uncertain, and will certainly not be the case for other recreation oriented
2 businesses like a marina. In fact, the Final Environmental Impact Report states, “recreation-
3 dependent businesses including marinas and recreational supply retailers may not be able to
4 economically weather the effects of multiyear construction activities and may be forced to
5 close as a result.”²

6 As discussed earlier, the economy of the primary zone faces many challenges that make
7 it vulnerable to disruption from WaterFix, and it is important to ensure these businesses can
8 survive a decade or more of construction. It is not unusual for large infrastructure projects to
9 negatively impact local businesses in the construction zone, and for those businesses to receive
10 compensation for those impacts even when those businesses could benefit from the project in
11 the long-run. At this time, the WaterFix does not include any such fund even though the
12 project will have extended, and likely permanent, negative effects to the region without any
13 offsetting long-run benefit from the infrastructure.

14 A highly-relevant current precedent is in Los Angeles, where businesses impacted by
15 Metro Rail’s tunneling and other construction activities as it expands its transit network are
16 eligible for compensation for lost business from Metro’s Business Interruption Fund (BIF).³
17 Metro describes BIF as follows:

18 “Metro’s Business Interruption Fund (BIF) provides financial
19 assistance to small “mom and pop” businesses located along the
20 Crenshaw/LAX Transit Project, the Little Tokyo area and the
21 2nd/Broadway segment of the Regional Connector, and Section 1
22 and Section 2 of the Purple Line Extension that are impacted by
23 transit rail construction.

24 Transit rail construction can mean growth opportunities for
25 small “mom and pop” businesses located along transit corridors;
26 however, transit construction also can be challenging for them.
27 Metro wants small businesses to continue to thrive throughout
28 construction and post construction. Through the establishment of

26 ² Page 16-168, Final EIR.
27 http://baydeltaconservationplan.com/Libraries/Dynamic_Document_Library/Final_EIR-EIS_Chapter_16_-_Socioeconomics.sflb.ashx

28 ³ http://media.metro.net/projects_studies/bif/images/factsheet_bif.pdf,
http://media.metro.net/projects_studies/bif/images/bif_faqs.pdf

1 the BIF, Metro can provide financial assistance to directly
2 impacted small businesses through grants to cover certain fixed
3 operating expenses.”

4 Metro provides \$10 million annually to BIF which makes payments to small businesses
5 (fewer than 25 employees) affected by certain construction projects. Eligible businesses can
6 receive compensation equal to 60% of demonstrated lost sales, up to \$50,000 annually, from
7 BIF. In my opinion, the Project should provide a similar fund for Delta businesses, although
8 higher compensation thresholds would be appropriate given the length of the construction
9 period, vulnerability of Delta businesses, and the fact that Delta businesses will not receive any
10 long-run benefits from the WaterFix after construction is complete. The economy and
11 community character of the Delta is at risk of permanent harm from business interruptions due
12 to the WaterFix, and the failure of the WaterFix to include a business interruption fund as is
13 currently part of large transportation tunneling projects in Los Angeles, greatly increases the
14 risk.

15 **III. By Failing to Submit a Benefit-Cost Analysis of the WaterFix, Petitioners Have**
16 **Failed to Follow Their Own Guidelines for Determining Whether a Project is In the**
17 **Public Interest.**

18 Benefit-cost analysis is well-established as a key part of determining if water resource
19 infrastructure investments are in the public interest. As WaterFix is estimated to be the most
20 expensive water infrastructure project ever proposed by the state of California, it is surprising
21 that DWR has not completed such an analysis, and does not appear to be submitting any
22 benefit-cost analysis in support of its Petition.

23 The Department of Water Resources' *Economic Analysis Guidebook*⁴ provides clear
24 definitions and guidelines for benefit-cost analysis, and clearly identifies its role in determining
25 whether a project is in the public interest. Page 5 of the *Guidebook* states:
26

27
28 ⁴ http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/planning/economic_analysis_guidebook/econguidebook.pdf

1 “The objective of economic analysis is to determine if a project
2 represents the best use of resources over the analysis period (that
3 is, the project is economically justified)”

4 “The economic analysis should answer questions such as, Should
5 the project be built at all? Should it be built now?, Should it be
6 built to a different configuration or size? Will the project have a
7 net positive social value for Californians irrespective of to whom
8 the costs and benefits accrue?”

9 In an October 2017 report, the California State Auditor found that DWR, by failing to
10 complete a benefit-cost analysis, was not following its own guidelines.⁵ The Auditor’s report
11 also includes the following explanation (see page 34) for the failure by DWR: “According to
12 DWR officials, the economic analysis could not be finalized because DWR determined it was
13 not possible to complete an accurate cost benefit analysis until understanding which agencies
14 will be participating in and funding the project and at what level.” This explanation is
15 inconsistent with DWR’s own guidelines, which state that a benefit-cost analysis determines
16 whether a project has “a net social value for Californians irrespective of to whom the costs and
17 benefits accrue” and how the project is financed. In fact, DWR and Reclamation have a long
18 history of producing benefit-cost analysis before project financing is finalized, because a major
19 benefit of the analysis is to inform the development of financial plans and the decisions of
20 stakeholders about whether to participate in a project.

21 **IV. Benefit-Cost Analysis of the WaterFix Demonstrates That the Project Is Not 22 Economically Justified.**

23 In “Benefit-Cost Analysis of the California WaterFix,”⁶ I estimated benefits and costs
24 for the operations described in the draft Biological Assessment, which assumed that the
25 WaterFix would generate an average annual water yield of 225,000 acre feet. The results of
26 my analysis are summarized below in Table 1. The base scenario estimates the value of water

27
28 ⁵ <https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2016-132.pdf>

⁶ <https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2016-132.pdf>

1 to urban agencies by the cost of alternative supplies as most recently estimated by DWR, and
 2 estimates the value of water to agricultural users by comparing market data on the rental value
 3 of irrigated and unirrigated farmland in 2014, a year where farm profits were near record high,
 4 water was relatively scarce, and irrigated land rents were at record levels. These values are
 5 then increased by 20% to account for the possibility that the value of water at the margin could
 6 increase faster than general inflation, and the value of urban water from the tunnels was not
 7 adjusted for pumping and treatment costs. Thus, even the base scenario could be seen as
 8 favorable to the tunnels. The “optimistic” scenario derives the value of water from earlier
 9 work to support the BDCP that exaggerated the future scarcity value of water by using out-of-
 10 date, high growth forecasts and assuming there would be no additional development of
 11 alternative water supplies, no increase in conservation, and no development of new technology
 12 for alternative water supplies. While the demand assumptions in the optimistic scenario are
 13 unrealistic and biased to favor the tunnels, it results in an average value of all incremental
 14 water from WaterFix that is very similar to the urban value of water in the base scenario.
 15 Thus, the optimistic scenario could be seen through another lens where the WaterFix is an
 16 urban-only project and the urban agencies pay all costs and receive all the incremental water
 17 supply benefits from the WaterFix.

18
 19 Table 1. Present Value of Benefits and Costs of the California WaterFix: 2014 dollars, 3.5%
 20 real discount rate, 15 years of construction, and 100 years of operation.

	Base scenario	Optimistic Scenario
Benefits		
Export Water Supply	\$1,319,521,208	\$2,822,409,124
Export Water Quality	\$1,677,361,307	\$1,677,361,307
Earthquake Risk Reduction	\$0	\$435,796,554
<i>Total Benefits</i>	<i>\$2,996,882,515</i>	<i>\$4,935,566,984</i>

1	Costs		
2	Construction and Mitigation	\$11,676,474,531	\$11,676,474,531
3	Operation and Maintenance	\$591,658,075	\$591,658,075
4	Ecosystem	\$0	\$0
5	In-Delta Municipal	\$111,279,332	\$37,093,107
6	In-Delta Agriculture	\$682,807,143	\$293,953,421
7	In-Delta Transportation	\$132,205,755	\$132,205,755
8	<i>Total Costs</i>	<i>\$13,194,424,836</i>	<i>\$12,731,384,889</i>
9	Net Benefit	(\$10,197,542,281)	(\$7,795,817,905)
10	Benefit/Cost ratio	0.23	0.39

11 The benefits of the tunnels include export water supply, export water quality, and risk
12 reduction from a catastrophic flood from an earthquake or other source that could interrupt
13 water exports. Costs include construction, mitigation and operation costs that would be paid
14 by exporters and impacts to third-parties such as environmental cost, in-Delta municipal,
15 agriculture and transportation impacts. As shown in Table 1, the results of the benefit-cost
16 analysis show the net benefit is negative \$10 billion and benefit-cost ratio is 0.23 for the base
17 scenario. Using optimistic values, the net benefit is negative \$7.8 billion and benefit-cost ratio
18 is 0.39. The WaterFix is clearly not economically justified with the water supply yields in the
19 Biological Assessment.

20 It should also be noted that the negative benefit-cost results presented above
21 incorporate many assumptions that favor the WaterFix tunnels. These favorable assumptions
22 include:
23
24
25
26
27
28

- 1 • The assumed annual average water yield of 225,000 af is higher than the estimated
2 water yield in the final EIR, 172,000 af.⁷
- 3 • Did not include any environmental costs despite the fact that final biological
4 assessments showed negative impacts on endangered and threatened species relative
5 to no project.
- 6 • It assumes no advances in alternative water supply technology for a century.
- 7 • It does not consider the risk of cost overruns.
- 8 • Excludes some areas of potential social costs, including impacts to upstream water
9 users and recreation.
- 10 • Uses a discount rate below the recommendation in DWR's Economic Analysis
11 Guidebook.

12 The results can be used to consider how much additional export water yield would be
13 needed for the WaterFix to be economically justified, if export water yield could be increased
14 without causing significant environmental harm or damage to 3rd-parties. The results show
15 that a break-even benefit-cost ratio of 1 would require annual average export water yields of
16 about 2 million acre feet (maf) in the base scenario, and nearly 1 maf annually in the optimistic
17 scenario. The highest water yield estimated in the Petition is the Boundary 1 (B1) scenario.
18 According to Thomas Burke, DSM2 modeling of B1 estimates an annual average water yield
19 of 812,000 acre feet. Thus, even the highest water supply scenario considered in the petition
20 falls short of a benefit-cost ratio of 1 when using the most optimistic approach to valuing the
21 benefits of the project.

22 The benefit-cost analysis clearly shows that the WaterFix petition is not economically
23 justified, and therefore, is not in the public interest.

24
25 **V. Petitioners have provided no evidence that the project is financially feasible,**
26 **ignoring their own guidelines and direction provided by the Board.**

27 _____
28 ⁷ From Table 5-12 of the Final EIR/EIS. <http://baydeltaconservationplan.com/FinalEIREIS.aspx>

1 Financial feasibility analysis is closely related to benefit-cost analysis. Feasibility
2 studies are a normal and well-established part of planning water resources projects. Agencies,
3 including the Petitioners, have well established guidelines for investigating and establishing
4 project feasibility. Other large water storage and conveyance proposals by Petitioners,
5 including Sites and Temperance Flat reservoirs and a proposed raise to Shasta dam, are
6 informed by feasibility studies that include significant economic and financial analysis.
7 WaterFix stands alone among the largest water infrastructure proposals in California for not
8 including economic or financial feasibility analyses, despite having the highest cost by far.

9 In addition to being a normal part of evidence presented to support a water resource
10 infrastructure project, the State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) Hearing
11 Team specifically requested evidence of feasibility in a March 4, 2016 ruling wherein the
12 Hearing Team stated “[t]he petitioners should also show that there are feasible operations
13 available to meet any performance standards.”⁸ Economic feasibility is essential to the
14 concept of operational feasibility, but Petitioners have provided no evidence to support
15 economic feasibility.

16 The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) defines “Feasible” as “capable of
17 being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into
18 account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.”⁹ The CEQA definition
19 of feasibility is the common meaning of the term applied in many legal and planning settings
20 throughout California. The definition explicitly lists economic factors among four areas of
21 consideration.

22 Economic and financial issues play a central role in the concept of feasibility in water
23 resources infrastructure planning.” In 2016, the California Water Commission identified the
24 following factors that inform project feasibility:¹⁰

25 _____
26 ⁸ Revised Hearing Schedule, Revised Notices of Intent to Appear, Electronic Service and Submissions, and Other
27 Procedural Issues Concerning the California WaterFix Water Right Change Petition Hearing, March 4, 2016, p. 2
⁹ Public Resources Code, § 21061.1.

28 ¹⁰https://cwc.ca.gov/Documents/2016/02_February/February2016_Agenda_Item_10_Attach_1_ModelingPresentation_final.pdf

- 1 • Project Description and Operations
- 2 • Feasibility Studies and Engineering
- 3 • Environmental Documentation, Mitigation Requirements, and Permit Status
- 4 • Cost Estimate
- 5 • Benefit/Cost Analysis
- 6 • Cost Allocation and Requested Amount
- 7 • Finance and Construction Planning
- 8 • Monitoring and Management Planning

9 As of this date, Petitioners have failed to provide any evidence regarding four of these
10 eight components of feasibility identified by the California Water Commission.

11
12 In 2014, DWR published “Guidance for Development of a State-Led Feasibility
13 Study.”¹¹ On page 1, the DWR guidance document identifies the three most important factors
14 to feasibility as follows:

- 15 • “Financing: feasibility studies must be accompanied with a reasonable and
16 implementable financing plan
- 17 • Agency Alignment: many water resource projects require permitting. Proper
18 environmental documentations and alignment of the agencies during the planning
19 process is needed to ensure support by permitting agencies
- 20 • Value assessment: it is critically important to our decision makers and the public to
21 understand the value of a proposed projects, how it helps the wellbeing of the
22 society, its health and safety, its environment and its economy”

23 Petitioners have presented no financing plan and no assessment of the economic value
24 of the WaterFix and thus are ignoring their own standards for determining project feasibility.

27
28 ¹¹ <http://www.water.ca.gov/floodmgmt/funding/docs/Final-Draft-Feasibility-Study-Guidance-wAppendices-2014.pdf>

1 Finally, the Department of Water Resources' *Economic Analysis Guidebook*,¹²
2 provides clear definitions and guidelines for financial feasibility analysis, and how these should
3 be conducted by the Department.

4 "The objective of financial analysis is to determine financial
5 feasibility (that is, whether someone is willing to pay for a project
6 and has the capability to raise the necessary funds). The test of
7 financial feasibility is passed if (a) beneficiaries are able to pay
8 reimbursable costs for project outputs over the project's repayment
9 period, (b) sufficient capital is authorized and available to finance
10 construction to completion, and (c) estimated revenues are
11 sufficient to cover allocated costs over the repayment period. Thus,
12 a financial analysis answers questions, such as, Who benefits from
13 a project? Who will repay the project costs? Are they able to meet
14 repayment obligations? Will the beneficiaries be financially better
15 off compared to what they will be obligated to pay? Within DWR,
16 the State Water Project Analysis Office performs financial
17 feasibility analyses for proposed SWP facilities."

18 There are more examples, but the point should be clear. Evidence of feasibility
19 requires evidence of economic and financial feasibility including benefit-cost analysis, and a
20 cost allocation with a financial plan. Economic and financial analysis is critically linked to
21 operational, engineering, and environmental feasibility. Petitioners have provided no evidence
22 of economic or financial feasibility consistent with long established professional standards,
23 including their own agency guidelines.

24 Permitting a financially infeasible project creates serious risk for the environment and
25 the public interest, particularly for a project such as WaterFix that has vast physical capacity
26 and enormous costs. These risks include a) the loss of funding for other critical public needs if
27 backing or subsidy from general tax revenues are required, b) funding diverted from other
28 environmental programs, c) failure to adequately fund mitigation actions, d) increased
economic, financial and political pressure on the State Water Board to approve Temporary
Urgency Change Petitions (TUCPs), and e) increased economic considerations and political

¹² http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/planning/economic_analysis_guidebook/econguidebook.pdf

1 opposition to implementing future environmental regulations, including the ESA and the Bay-
2 Delta Water Quality Control Plan. These latter risks are of particular interest to the State
3 Water Board since Petitioners have frequently requested and received TUCPs from the State
4 Water Board due to economic considerations, especially in drought conditions. Debt service
5 for WaterFix is estimated to impose over \$1 billion in new annual costs on Petitioners, and
6 would further increase economic and political pressure for TUCPs in dry years since these
7 large debt payments are still required during years where water exports, and thus revenues
8 from water sales and agricultural production are low. Financial feasibility requires provisions
9 to ensure debt payments can still be made during these dry years while maintaining
10 environmental requirements. Furthermore, the State Water Board is considering new
11 regulations as it updates the Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan and should ensure that the
12 WaterFix is financially feasible under any new regulations that could result from the Bay-Delta
13 Plan update since economic considerations are considered in water quality control plans
14 according to Water Code section 13241. Given the linkage between the Bay-Delta Water
15 Quality Control Plan and the WaterFix, it is important to demonstrate that WaterFix is
16 economically justified and that its proposed operations are financially feasible so that these
17 issues do not become a barrier to achieving environmental objectives of the Bay-Delta Plan.

18
19 **VI. There is considerable evidence that the WaterFix is not financially feasible.**

20 In summer and fall of 2017, state and federal customers were asked by DWR to vote on
21 whether they would fund their share of construction costs, defined as the share of water
22 exported from the Delta that they receive. In September 2017, the largest potential agricultural
23 water contractor voted 7-1 not to participate in the WaterFix, and afterwards stated, “from
24 Westlands’ perspective, the project is not financially viable.”¹³ Subsequent to this,
25 Reclamation stated that it would not be funding the WaterFix, and DWR had assumed
26 Reclamation would pay 45% of the project costs. The WaterFix did not fare much better on

27 _____
28 ¹³ <https://mavensnotebook.com/2017/09/20/this-just-in-westlands-water-district-statement-on-california-waterfix/>

1 the State Water Project side as Kern County Water Agency only approved funding about one-
2 half of their share, and Santa Clara Valley Water District did not approve the project described
3 in the Petition, and instead voted to conditionally approve a single-tunnel with conditions on
4 cost and environmental impacts that seem unlikely to be met.

5 Metropolitan Water District was the only major water agency to approve its full share
6 of the WaterFix, approximately 26% of the cost. However, it is important to note that
7 Metropolitan Water District staff described the project to its board in a way that is inconsistent
8 with the Petition. Specifically, Metropolitan Water District staff did not compare the WaterFix
9 to the No Action alternative as is done in the Environmental Impact Report, Biological
10 Assessment and this Petition. Instead, Metropolitan staff created an alternative no-tunnel
11 scenario that reduces water exports by more than 1 maf compared to the EIR No-Action
12 alternative, and thus is much more protective of the environment. This change to the no-tunnel
13 assumption increases the project's water yield to 1.3 maf per year, which is 7.5 times larger
14 than the 172,000 acre feet of yield in the final EIR. This assumption makes the project appear
15 to have much lower unit costs, but it implicitly assumes that the WaterFix has a level of
16 protection from future environmental regulations and a level of environmental performance
17 that is not supported by the Petition or any of the environmental documents supporting the
18 Petition. Specifically, the Metropolitan Water District white paper states,

19 "Without California WaterFix, it is estimated that combined future
20 SWP and CVP average annual exports could potentially decrease
21 to 3.5 to 3.9 million acre-feet (MAF) from the current average
22 annual supply of 4.9 MAF. With California WaterFix, the range of
23 combined annual exports in future years is projected to be 4.7 to
24 5.3 MAF." (page 4)

25 "The estimated future supply without California WaterFix assumes
26 increasing future regulatory constraints. Since the long-term trend
27 has been toward increased regulation and reduced supply of the
28 SWP and CVP, it is assumed that this trend would continue into
the future." (page 10)¹⁴

¹⁴ http://www.mwdh2o.com/DOCSVCsPubs/WaterFix/assets/cawaterfix_operations_whitepaper_factsheet.pdf

1
2 Thus, the Metropolitan white paper is based on an assumption that regulatory
3 constraints will not increase with WaterFix beyond what is described in the initial operating
4 criteria in the EIR, but much more stringent regulatory constraints will occur without
5 WaterFix. This is the only scenario it uses to evaluate the proposal. The assumption that
6 increasing regulatory constraints brought on by poor environmental performance is more likely
7 without WaterFix than with it is simply contrary to the findings of the Biological Opinions that
8 found Winter-run Chinook salmon and other species would fair more poorly with WaterFix
9 than without, and only assessed species impacts at the programmatic level making it likely that
10 future consultations could further restrict the water yield from the project. Also, these future
11 supply assumptions ignore potential limitations resulting from imposition of Delta Flow
12 Criteria by the State Water Board in this proceeding. The State Water Board, in a ruling dated
13 February 11, 2016, stated that “[t]he appropriate Delta flow criteria will be more stringent than
14 petitioners’ current obligations and may well be more stringent than the petitioners’ preferred
15 project.”¹⁵ Thus, even Metropolitan Water District’s board approval was based on a project
16 description that is inconsistent with the EIR and the analysis that supports this petition to the
17 Board.

18 A key issue for financial feasibility of the project is that the cost per acre foot varies
19 dramatically with the project yield. Noted water economist and consultant Dr. Rodney Smith
20 provided me with a brief report that calculates the cost per acre foot for the delta tunnels at
21 various levels of project yield.¹⁶ The table below shows his results and clearly illustrates the
22 important relationship between the project’s operations and its financial requirements. Dr.
23 Smith advises that a risk premium of between 1% and 2% over a risk-free U.S. Treasury Bond
24 is appropriate for the WaterFix given historic borrowing rates of California utilities and the
25 environmental and cost risk profile of the WaterFix. Thus, Dr. Smith estimates the cost of the

26
27 ¹⁵[https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/california_waterfix/docs/021116p
hc_ruling.pdf](https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/california_waterfix/docs/021116p
hc_ruling.pdf), p. 4.

28 ¹⁶ SDWA 148.

1 Waterfix incremental water yield would be in excess of \$6,000 per acre foot for most of the
 2 scenarios described in the Petition because yields are generally 200,000 acre feet or less. Even
 3 using the more generous yield assumptions from the Metropolitan Water District operations
 4 white paper, the cost of incremental water supplies would exceed \$1,000 af. Dr. Smith notes
 5 that these costs are for a non-firm supply of untreated water in Tracy and thus pumping,
 6 treatment and reliability would need to be considered, and would increase the cost over those
 7 reflected in the table.

8 Annualized Cost of Twin Tunnels Water (2014\$) by Incremental Yield of Tunnels

Annual Yield		Risk Premium		
(acre feet)	0%	1%	2%	
100,000	\$9,590	\$12,817	\$16,926	
200,000	\$4,795	\$6,408	\$8,463	
300,000	\$3,197	\$4,272	\$5,642	
400,000	\$2,397	\$3,204	\$4,231	
500,000	\$1,918	\$2,563	\$3,385	
600,000	\$1,598	\$2,136	\$2,821	
700,000	\$1,370	\$1,831	\$2,418	
800,000	\$1,199	\$1,602	\$2,116	
900,000	\$1,066	\$1,424	\$1,881	
1,000,000	\$959	\$1,282	\$1,693	
1,100,000	\$872	\$1,165	\$1,539	
1,200,000	\$799	\$1,068	\$1,410	

1	1,300,000	\$738	\$986	\$1,302
2	1,400,000	\$685	\$915	\$1,209
3	1,500,000	\$639	\$854	\$1,128
4	1,600,000	\$599	\$801	\$1,058
5	1,700,000	\$564	\$754	\$996
6	1,800,000	\$533	\$712	\$940
7	1,900,000	\$505	\$675	\$891
8	2,000,000	\$479	\$641	\$846

12

13 Given proportional cost allocation, where all water users are paying the same cost per

14 unit of water received through the tunnels, financial feasibility is going to be determined by

15 comparing the cost of the project to the participants with the lowest ability and willingness to

16 pay. Thus, the feasibility should be determined by comparing the values to the willingness and

17 ability to pay of agricultural users who also receive the majority of water exported from the

18 Delta. Currently, most studies place the value of agricultural water in California at around

19 \$150-\$200 per acre foot. The highest estimated value I have ever seen estimated for

20 agricultural water south of the Delta is a recent estimate by the California Water Commission

21 that considers the effects of fully implementing the Sustainable Groundwater Act which will

22 increase water scarcity in the valley. This modeling places the value of agricultural water in an

23 average year at about \$600 af after full SGMA implementation after 2045. Even if we consider

24 that agricultural water could be worth \$600 af in the future, Dr. Smith's table shows the cost

25 per acre foot exceeds \$600 per acre foot at 2.0 maf of average annual yield, which is far

26 outside the range of plausible water yields even under the most favorable assumptions for

27 water exports.

28

1 Feasibility of the project would increase if a finance plan were developed such that all
2 of the incremental water went to urban contractors such as the Metropolitan Water District. At
3 about 700,000 acre feet of annual yield, the tunnels would have similar average cost as the
4 desalination plant recently opened in Carlsbad. However, a desalination plant in Southern
5 California is a superior water supply source to the tunnels because it is reliable in droughts and
6 provides purified water close to the point of consumption rather than untreated water in Tracy.
7 WaterFix yield needs to be in excess of 1 maf per year before it is competitive with most
8 relevant urban alternatives such as water recycling plants. This yield is far outside the range
9 considered in the Petition and thus WaterFix as described in this Petition may not be feasible
10 even as an urban-only project.

11 12 **VII. Conclusion**

13 In conclusion, the WaterFix petition fails to include any evidence that the WaterFix is
14 economically justified or financially feasible even though such information is critically linked
15 to engineering and environmental feasibility and a normal part of project evaluation. While
16 Petitioners provided no evidence on these subjects, there is ample evidence from other benefit-
17 cost analyses of the project, calculations of cost per acre foot, and recent votes by potential
18 WaterFix beneficiaries on whether to participate in WaterFix that shows very clearly that the
19 project is neither economically justified or financially feasible as described in the Petition. In
20 addition, the WaterFix is likely to cause permanent damage to small businesses in the Delta
21 that serve recreational users and the local community and WaterFix.

22
23
24 Dated: November 29, 2017

25 
26 _____
27 JEFFREY MICHAEL, PhD
28

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27 **BEFORE THE**
28 **CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD**

29 HEARING IN THE MATTER OF
30 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
31 RESOURCES AND UNITED STATES
32 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
33 REQUEST FOR A CHANGE IN POINT OF
34 DIVERSION FOR CALIFORNIA WATER FIX

**WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF
THOMAS STOKELY –
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT**

(Part 2 Rebuttal)

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1 **A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

2 My name is Thomas Stokely. I am presenting this rebuttal testimony on behalf of Local
 3 Agencies of the North Delta (“LAND”), San Joaquin County, and Sacramento County in this
 4 evidentiary hearing before the State Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”)
 5 concerning the petition to change the point of diversion for the California WaterFix (“CWF” or
 6 “Delta Tunnels”) for the State Water Project (“SWP”) and federal Central Valley Project
 7 (“CVP”), as specified in the licenses and permits of the US Bureau of Reclamation (“USBR”)
 8 and the California Department of Water Resources (“DWR”).

9 I have previously testified in this Hearing. My statement of qualifications was provided
 10 in Exhibit PCFFA-88, as modified by my testimony on March 27, 2018. (March 27, 2018
 11 Hearing Transcript, page 32, lines 3 to 8; see also LAND-267 [updated Statement of
 12 Qualifications.] My PowerPoint for this testimony is LAND-268. This rebuttal testimony
 13 responds to the assertions by DWR witnesses Christopher Earle (DWR-1014 and DWR-1072)
 14 and Marin Greenwood (DWR-1012 and DWR-1029) that due to adaptive management,
 15 Petitioners’ proposed project (CWF H3+) will be reasonably protective of fish and wildlife.
 16 (DWR-1012, pp. 4:7–17; 3:21–4:2; 24:7–12; 25:19–26:2; 27:1–3; 38:20–23; 40:5–10; 44:12–
 17 20; 46:22–47:11; 49:13–17 & fn. 60; DWR-1014, pp. 4:14–20; 4:28–5:7; 8:18–27; see also
 18 Hearing Transcripts, February 22, 2018, pp. 60–62, 146–147; March 5, 2018, pp. 110–114,
 19 116–118, 120–128, 132–138, 142–145; March 9, 2018, pp. 96–100, 113–119 [cross
 20 examination regarding adaptive management].) Earle and Greenwood’s testimony refers to
 21 the proposed Adaptive Management Program for the CWF and Current Biological Opinions
 22 on the Coordinated Operations of the Central Valley and State Water Projects (“Delta Tunnels
 23 AMP”). (See SWRCB-107, Att. 5; see also SWRCB-102, SWRCB-104, Appendix 3.H,
 24 SWRCB-105, SWRCB-106, SWRCB-108, SWRCB-110 and SWRCB-111.)

25 The Delta Tunnels AMP is a planning process that DWR, USBR, National Marine
 26 Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”), and
 27 California Department of Fish and Wildlife (“CDFW”) propose to undertake to address
 28 ecological uncertainties associated with management of the proposed Delta Tunnels as part

1 of the CVP and SWP. (SWRCB 107, Att. 5, p. 3.) According to Petitioners, the Delta Tunnels
2 AMP will establish the Interagency Implementation Coordination Group (“IICG”), which will
3 oversee the development and implementation of the Delta Tunnels AMP. The IICG will be
4 composed of representatives of USBR, USFWS, NMFS, DWR, CDFW, a federal water
5 contractor, and a state water contractor. According to Petitioners, the Delta Tunnels AMP will
6 apply science to address the effectiveness of management actions and address physical and
7 biological uncertainties related to these actions.

8 My testimony focuses on the serious deficiencies in the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP
9 as a future decision-making structure and the unacceptably high likelihood that it will fail to
10 achieve its stated objectives. My critique of the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP is based largely
11 on my experience with the failure of the Trinity River Restoration Program’s (“TRRP”) Adaptive
12 Environmental Assessment and Management (“AEAM”) Program established by the
13 2000 Trinity River Record of Decision (“Trinity ROD”) (PCFFA-98). I will compare the AEAM’s
14 Program structure to the Delta Tunnels AMP, using elements identified by the Delta
15 Independent Science Board (“DISB”) and others as critical to a successful adaptive
16 management program. The failures of the AEAM Program—and the causes underlying those
17 failures—are well documented. In my opinion, the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP and the
18 AEAM Program share critically important deficiencies. In particular, (1) they both have fatally
19 flawed decision-making processes with built in conflicts of interest; (2) neither plan
20 encourages meaningful stakeholder and public support and participation in decision making;
21 and (3) both plans mistakenly rely on an assumption of unlimited dedicated funding to
22 implement adaptive management.

23 I conclude that for many of the same reasons the AEAM Program has failed, the Delta
24 Tunnels AMP, as currently proposed, is very unlikely to succeed in achieving its objectives.
25 As I will explain, one need look no further than the adaptive management recommendations
26 of the DISB to understand why these deficiencies in the two plans undermine those
27 objectives. (SWRCB-51.) Moreover, the Department of the Interior’s own adaptive
28 management guidelines underscore some of the serious deficiencies in the Delta Tunnels

1 AMP. (LAND-244.) Although the Delta Tunnels AMP, as proposed, would not be implemented
2 as a decision-making structure until many years from now, the Petition depends on the
3 unfounded assumption that the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP will succeed, in order to satisfy
4 Petitioners' burden of proving that the Petition will not result in injury to legal users of water or
5 unreasonable adverse effects to fish and wildlife. For the reasons I describe, the Delta
6 Tunnels AMP is unlikely to succeed.

7 Petitioners have deferred critical decisions on a vast range of key operational
8 challenges the Delta Tunnels will face for implementation of the Delta Tunnels AMP. As
9 proposed, the Delta Tunnels AMP does not include safeguards that would ensure that
10 changes in operations developed under the AMP will not result in injury to public trust
11 resources, especially fish and wildlife, or to other legal uses and users of water. In my opinion,
12 the plan's critical deficiencies—including the lack of a meaningful opportunity for stakeholders
13 (both water users and environmental) to participate in the adaptive management process, the
14 absence of dependable and flexible financing, and the lack of clear and enforceable conflict-
15 of-interest provisions—are fatal to the Delta Tunnels AMP, as proposed, and thus should
16 result in denial of the Petition.

17 **B. TRINITY RIVER ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE**

18 My experience with the AEAM Program predates the Trinity ROD. In 1988, as an
19 employee of the Trinity County Planning Department, I began working to restore the Trinity
20 River's fisheries through funding provided by the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife
21 Management Program authorized by PL 98-541 (PCFFA-92). I ran a small fishery restoration
22 grant program and took minutes and acted as the administrative assistant for the chairman of
23 the Technical Coordinating Committee of the Trinity River Task Force. Through the small
24 grant program, combined with other funding sources, I oversaw many on-the-ground fishery
25 restoration projects, development of new reservoir and river temperature models, as well as
26 various other projects and studies.

27 From 1994 through 2003, I represented Trinity County as the CEQA lead agency for
28 the NEPA/CEQA documents (an EIS/EIR and a supplemental/recirculated draft EIS/EIR) that

1 led to the Trinity ROD, which included the AEAM Program, as described in Appendix C from
2 the Trinity ROD (LAND-269) and the 2000 Biological Opinion by the National Marine Fisheries
3 Service (PCFFA-109).

4 Following adoption of the Trinity ROD in 2000, I acted as Trinity County's CEQA lead
5 agency representative for the Trinity River Bridges EIR/EA to replace four undersized bridges
6 and a culvert on the Trinity River. I also acted as the CEQA lead agency representative for the
7 Indian Creek Rehabilitation Site EIR/EA. I was Trinity County's alternate representative on the
8 Trinity Management Council ("TMC"), which was established under the Trinity ROD as a
9 board of directors for the TRRP. I was a co-author of the 2004 "Trinity Management Council
10 Subcommittee Trinity River Restoration Program Evaluation Final Report". (LAND-270).

11 In January 2012, former Interior Secretary Salazar appointed me as a member of the
12 Trinity Adaptive Management Working Group ("TAMWG"), representing commercial salmon
13 fishing interests. I was reappointed by former Interior Secretary Sally Jewell in March 2015.
14 My appointment expired in March 2018 but the TAMWG was effectively disbanded, i.e.,
15 declared "administratively inactive" by the Interior Department in November 2018 (LAND-271),
16 thereby ending all formal public participation in the TRRP. The TAMWG was the federal
17 advisory committee established as part of the Trinity ROD to provide a venue for stakeholder
18 input to the TMC concerning the implementation of the TRRP (LAND-269, Trinity ROD,
19 Append. C.) The USFWS managed the TAMWG and provided member travel expenses, a
20 paid note-taker, and a "Designated Federal Officer" to oversee the group.

21 The failures of the AEAM Program have been well documented since 2004. That
22 documentation includes the 2004 "Trinity Management Council Subcommittee Trinity River
23 Restoration Program Evaluation Final Report" (LAND-270), the 2008 CDR Associates "Trinity
24 River Situation Assessment" (LAND-272), the June 2016 letter by the California Advisory
25 Committee on Salmon and Steelhead Trout (LAND-273), and the TRRP Science Advisory
26 Board's Phase I review (LAND-274, Buffington et al. 2014). Two reports have been issued by
27 Headwaters Corporation under that contract with Reclamation, including a 2017 "Summary
28 Report on Trinity River Restoration Program Goals and Objectives Including Components of

1 Governance and Adaptive Management” (LAND-278) and the 2017 “Summary of Trinity River
 2 Restoration Program Interviews Final Report to the Trinity River Restoration Program”
 3 (LAND-279).

4 **C. KEY PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT**

5 In preparing my testimony, I carefully considered the August 2015 draft report of the
 6 DISB, “Adaptive Management in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, How Is It Used and How
 7 Can It Be Improved,” which developed the following recommendations to improve adaptive
 8 management in the Delta:

- 9 1. Create a Delta Adaptive Management Team (AMT)
- 10 2. Support adaptive management with funding that is dependable yet flexible.
- 11 3. Monitor.
- 12 4. Capitalize on unplanned experiments.
- 13 5. Use selected restoration sites to test adaptive-management and monitoring
 protocols.
- 14 6. Integrate science and regulations to enhance flexibility.
- 15 7. Recognize where adaptive management is not appropriate.
- 16 8. If the impediments to conducting adaptive management are insurmountable,
 revisit or revise the mandates.

17 (SWRCB-51, pp. 2–4, 35–39.)

18 In this testimony, I will evaluate the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP, focusing on the first
 19 three DISB recommendations and applying the lessons learned from the AEAM Program’s
 20 adaptive management experience. Using the first three DISB recommendations as an
 21 analytical lens, I will also give my professional opinion about how likely the Delta Tunnels
 22 AMP is to succeed at implementing adaptive management and achieving its stated objectives.
 23 I will also opine on the suitability of the Delta Tunnels AMP for addressing CWF operation and
 24 mitigation assumptions for spring outflows (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, pp. 60–64, SWRCB-111, pp.
 25 2-21 to 2-22 [mitigation for longfin smelt]), fall X2 outflows (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, pp. 60–64),
 26 farmland loss (SWRCB-111, pp. 2-41 to 2-44), and water quality impacts such as selenium
 27 (SWRCB-111, pp. 3-75 to 3-76), salinity, and Microcystis (SWRCB-111, pp. 2-13 to 2-14.).

28 **Trinity River Adaptive Management Comparison to DISB Recommendations**

Similar to the DISB’s methodology used to assess adaptive management in the Delta,
 Headwaters Corporation conducted a series of written and oral interviews in 2017 with TRRP

1 participants for the report, "Summary of Trinity River Restoration Program Interviews. Final
2 Report to the Trinity River Restoration Program," hereafter, the "Headwaters Report." (LAND-
3 279.) Before applying the Trinity River lessons, the DISB recommendations, and the
4 Headwaters Report to the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP, it is useful to examine the failures of
5 the AEAM Program using the DISB recommendations and Headwaters Report. The findings
6 in the Headwaters Report and pertinent sections of the DISB's recommendations are set forth
7 below:

8 **DISB Recommendation 1. Create A Delta Adaptive Management Team.**

9 The AMT should be composed of individuals who are knowledgeable and skilled
10 in all phases of adaptive management. These individuals may be drawn from
11 agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, or other sources, but all
12 will be dedicated, full-time members of the Team who operate independently of
13 state or federal agencies. The Team will work closely with those who plan,
14 implement, or oversee management actions in the Delta. Strong leadership will
15 be required to foster the mutual trust and respect among scientists, managers,
16 stakeholders, decision-makers, and agencies that are needed to design and
17 conduct coordinated adaptive management and navigate the tangled web of
18 Delta interests.

19 (SWRCB-51, p. 36.)

20 The Headwaters Report clearly identified the AEAM Program's shortcomings with
21 respect to the DISB's teamwork recommendation:

22 Interviewees indicated there is limited TRRP identity. People identify themselves
23 as working for their specific agency/entity and not for the TRRP. There is little
24 sense of team or collaborative spirit within the program.

25 Several interviewees pointed to a lack of continuity in leadership as a problem
26 for the TRRP. There is no consistent TRRP vision/plan so each new agency
27 head brings their own interests and focus to the program, some of which
28 frequently are not consistent with the TRRP goal. [¶] . . . [¶]

Regarding the role of the federal agencies in staffing the TRRP, some
interviewees focused on staff in the Weaverville office as being the unit that
should be transferred to an independent entity, like the USGS or a private
contractor. Another option would be to continue to house TRRP staff from
different agencies/entities but that the Executive Director (ED) should have
direct supervisory authority over all TRRP staff housed at that office. There was
no clear model described that was viewed as a way to overcome seeming
internal difficulty in the relationship between Reclamation TRRP staff and
Service TRRP staff. [¶] . . . [¶]

1 Several interviewees viewed the DOI agencies (Reclamation and Service) as
2 having a great deal of animosity towards each other and not working together
3 effectively. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Reclamation
4 and the Service expired over a year ago and a revision has not been signed by
5 either agency. Some interviewees felt finalizing this MOU was critical because it
6 outlines how the Executive Director, Science Coordinator, and Implementation
Branch Chief will work together as a staff leadership team for the TRRP. Many
interviewees described a feeling of distrust of the Tribes by other TRRP
partners. Interviewees viewed the two Tribes as not getting along which
translates into difficulties at the TMC level.

7 (LAND-279, pp. 7–8.)

8 The TRRP’s lack of an effective independent team was not otherwise saved by a
9 strong framework that was less subject to the vagaries of individual personalities and
10 interests. On the issue of a framework, the TRRP Science Advisory Board, in its Phase I
11 review (LAND-274, Buffington et al 2014), identified serious frailties of the AEAM Program.
12 These included:

- 13 • Lack of integration of program activities and data collection (p. 33);
- 14 • Lack of formal hypothesis testing (p. 33); and
- 15 • Lack of a formal adaptive management framework (p. 33 [“A formal adaptive
16 management framework is needed, as called for in the ROD (USDOI 2000), to better
17 structure and integrate Program activities and to increase the defensibility and
18 transparency of management actions.”]).

19 **DISB Recommendation 2. Support adaptive management with funding that is**
20 **dependable yet flexible.**

21 Adaptive management in the Delta will not become a reality unless the paucity
22 and unpredictability of funding to support critical stages of the process are
23 remedied. Radical approaches to funding adaptive management are needed.
24 The past and present piecemeal approaches will not provide the long-term
support needed to reach the “adapt” part of the process, without which there is
only a business-as-usual management approach.

25 (SWRCB-51, pp. 37-38)

26 **DISB Recommendation 3. Monitor.**

27 Monitoring the right things, at the right times, and in the right places, is essential.
28 Without it, there is no way to know whether management actions are moving

1 toward the desired goal or toward a different, less desirable, outcome.
 2 Designing monitoring protocols to fit the magnitude of management actions and
 3 the timing of important ecosystem processes would make the value of adaptive
 4 management more readily apparent. Developing an institutionalized regional
 approach to monitoring could also help to coordinate actions among projects
 and facilitate the collection, analysis, and synthesis of data that are compatible
 across projects.

5 (SWRCB-51, p. 38.)

6 Funding and monitoring for adaptive management are integrally linked. The DISB
 7 noted this conflict:

8 Where they are not accorded a high priority, adaptive management and
 9 monitoring activities are likely to languish when funds are tight. Moreover,
 10 available funds often come in pulses, making it difficult to sustain the monitoring,
 data analysis, and evaluation that are essential to doing adaptive management.

11 (SWRCB-51, p. 2.)

12 The TRRP has had a long-standing conflict between funding for monitoring of adult
 13 salmon populations and adaptive management monitoring. Adaptive Management monitoring
 14 was consistently shortchanged in order to fund other projects such as adult weirs and redd
 15 surveys.

16 On the tension between funding and monitoring in the AEAM Program, the Headwaters
 17 Report stated:

18 TRRP science is viewed by many as being a lower priority in the budget than
 19 construction projects. Many interviewees described science (or adaptive
 20 management) as receiving what is left over in the budget after construction
 21 projects are funded. The TRRP was described as data rich but information poor.
 For example, there is a belief that the TRRP is creating more habitat for fish and
 producing more juvenile fish, but there are no reports showing these results and
 making these connections. [¶] . . . [¶]

22 This was a significant concern noted by nearly all interviewees [on conflicts of
 23 interest]. Interviewees stated that TMC members are voting on budgets that
 24 benefit their agencies/entities in staffing, construction projects, and monitoring
 25 and see this as a significant conflict of interest. . . . [T]here was significant
 26 concern raised by multiple interviewees that this conflict of interest in the
 budget, how money is allocated to projects, and how decisions are made about
 this allocation is a potential fatal flaw for the TRRP.

27 (LAND-279, pp. 8–9.)

1 The Headwaters questionnaire asked about the overall health of the TRRP and
2 received a negative response that several respondents felt was a result of the following
3 problems:

- 4 • The culture of the overall TRRP was described as “a meeting culture” not a
5 “doing culture”.
- 6 • TRRP leadership was frequently described as “lacking”.
- 7 • The lack of a strategic plan and common vision for the TRRP is viewed as a
8 significant impediment to progress on the goals and objectives.
- 9 • The TRRP is viewed as lacking transparency. Issues are decided behind closed
10 doors, quid pro quo deals are struck between partners, and any negative or
11 unexpected outcomes regarding construction projects or monitoring are
12 suppressed.
- 13 • Staff turnover at the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
14 Service is viewed as a significant issue that contributes to the lack of a
15 consistent vision/mission of the TRRP.

16 (LAND-279, p. 4, lines 124–132.)

17 In summary, while touted originally as a model adaptive management and
18 environmental management program, the Trinity River AEAM Program is not implementing
19 adaptive management in a manner that the DISB recommends and the authors of the Trinity
20 ROD envisioned. This failure is well documented by the fact that USBR has committed
21 significant financial resources for the TRRP “program refinement” contract with the
22 Headwaters Corporation. Past recommendations such as those found in the 2008 CDR
23 Situation Assessment Report (LAND-272) have been largely ignored, and more money is
24 being spent to come up with solutions that likely won’t be implemented.

25 **D. THE PROPOSED DELTA TUNNELS AMP WILL LIKELY FAIL DUE TO THE SAME**
26 **PROBLEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE AEAM PROGRAM FAILURE**

27 **1. There are No Assurances for a Strong, Cooperative and Complete**
28 **Adaptive Management Team**

According to the DISB, an effective Delta Tunnels adaptive management program
requires an adaptive management team with strong leadership and full time committed
members with a strong sense of trust. (SWRCB-51, p. 36.) With agencies having different
missions, conflicts often arise as agencies focus on priorities aligned with their agency

1 mission rather than the goals and objectives (mission) of an interagency program. This
2 creates dysfunction, hinders implementation and limits the potential for success of
3 interagency collaborative efforts at adaptive management such as the TRRP and that being
4 proposed for the Delta Tunnels by the DISB.

5 The proposed Delta Tunnels AMP structure includes the same five agencies that are
6 all members of the TMC. The USFWS, USBR, NMFS, DWR and CDFW all are members of
7 the TMC and would also be members of the proposed IICG, along with San Luis-Delta
8 Mendota Water Authority (“SLDMWA”) and the State Water Contractors (“SWC”). (SWRCB-
9 107, Att. 5, p. 10.) These entities are not independent. They are the same parties that will
10 plan, implement, and oversee management actions coming out of the Delta Tunnels AMP
11 process. While water contractors with an interest in diverting as much water as possible from
12 the new intakes would be included, nowhere in the Delta Tunnels AMP process is there an
13 opportunity for meaningful input from in-Delta governments, water users, landowners,
14 fishermen, environmentalists, upstream water users, or other stakeholders whose interests
15 would be affected by those same diversions.

16 The DOI’s Adaptive Management and Overview Slide Show (LAND-276, slide 4)
17 identifies set-up phase one as “Stakeholders as Partners”. Other authors consistently cite
18 public participation as an essential feature of a successful adaptive management program.

19 A key failure of the Trinity AEAM Program is that DOI did not follow its own
20 recommendations. Broad stakeholder participation was not included, and the TRRP
21 stakeholders that were included were never treated as partners. The TAMWG was mis-
22 named as the “Trinity Adaptive Management Working Group.” Yet, the TAMWG was simply a
23 federal advisory committee without a vote at the TMC, where the decisions are actually made.
24 Originally, the TAMWG chairman was not a member of the TMC, but, following the 2008 CDR
25 Situation Assessment (LAND-272), the TAMWG chairman was granted a membership on the
26 TMC, albeit a non-voting one. This lack of public support and partnership among stakeholders
27 has led to dysfunction within the AEAM Program.

28

1 The death of stakeholder involvement in the TRRP came with the dissolution of the
2 TAMWG in November 2017 by DOI. DOI was dishonest in its explanation of why the TAMWG
3 was disbanded. (LAND-271.) Interior said that a written justification for the group to continue
4 had not been submitted, but in fact it had occurred, according to a FOIA response to the
5 *Eureka Times Standard*. (LAND-271.) This lack of candor by a member of the key decision
6 making body is indicative of the protectionist mentality that interviewees have said is
7 pervasive among the agencies, where concern for agency budgets and projects appears to
8 have been more important than a collaborative, science-driven process.

9 Similar to the AEAM Program, key stakeholders are excluded from the Delta Tunnels
10 AMP. Such exclusion will mean that key concerns are similarly not considered in the Delta
11 Tunnels AMP process. Based on my extensive experience with the TRRP, it is my opinion
12 that the outcome of the Delta Tunnels AMP is likely to be similar to that of the TRRP. In fact, it
13 appears more likely that the Delta Tunnels AMP could suffer from the same protectionist
14 mentality because the majority of IICG members have a vested interest in increased Delta
15 exports (BOR, DWR, SWC and SLDMWA), and the Collaborative Science and Adaptive
16 Management Program (“CSAMP”) policy group (LAND 281) currently does not represent
17 important interests like Delta agriculture or local public agencies, and it only includes one
18 representative of in-Delta and upstream water users.

19 **2. Dependable and Flexible Funding Is Not Assured**

20 The DISB also recommends that there be “dependable yet flexible” funding for the
21 proposed Delta Tunnels AMP and that the right kind of monitoring be funded. (SWRCB-51, p.
22 3.) As mentioned previously, funding and monitoring are linked. With respect to monitoring
23 within an adaptive management program, the DISB has said:

24 Monitoring the right things, at the right times, and in the right places, is essential.
25 Without monitoring, little is learned and success (or failure) cannot be evaluated.
26 Designing monitoring protocols to fit management actions and the timing of
27 important ecosystem processes will make the value of adaptive management
28 more readily apparent.

(SWRCB-51, p. 3.)

1 The DISB identified the conflict between funding for historic monitoring and adaptive
 2 management monitoring:

3 Thus, adaptive management is often viewed as an unfunded mandate. We
 4 believe that people and programs generally want to, and try to, practice adaptive
 5 management, but without dedicated and reliable funding they are reluctant to do
 so at the expense of existing projects and programs.

6 (SWRCB-51, p. 29)

7 The DISB, in its evaluation of Delta adaptive management (SWRCB-51, p. 12), found
 8 inadequate funding to be the most common response from Delta adaptive management
 9 participants:

10 The strongest, most uniform response we received, however, was disagreement
 11 with the statement that “Monitoring is adequately funded to support adaptive
 12 management.” This concern will emerge often in this report; we consider it
 further in Section VI.

13 The Delta Tunnels AMP (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, p. 4) acknowledges that “significant”
 14 funding is necessary:

15 Success of the adaptive management process outlined within this Framework
 16 **hinges upon significant new investments in related research**, monitoring
 17 and modeling that build on existing efforts. These investments will address key
 uncertainties related to water operations and threatened and endangered
 species that have been raised in a number of different venues . . .

18 (*Emphasis added*)

19 The Draft Adaptive Management Framework for the Delta Tunnels further addressed
 20 the tension between institutional capacity and funding:

21 The key issue is whether existing efforts, individually and collectively, have
 22 enough capacity both in terms of staff capacity and senior researcher capacity,
 23 and have stable funding to ensure a long-term scientific basis to support
 24 successful adaptive management decision making that is relevant to project
 operations now and in the future.

25 (SWRCB-104, Append. 3H, p. 3.)

26 The TRRP had a remarkably stable and generous budget, averaging around \$15
 27 million/year for several years. In my opinion, the TRRP had more than adequate funding to
 28 implement an effective fishery restoration and adaptive management program. However, the

1 problem lies with the decision-making process of the TMC. There was also a great deal of
2 controversy about how to allocate the funds. There are no conflict of interest requirements for
3 TMC members, who are able to vote on funding for their own agency/tribal programs and
4 projects. Exacerbating that problem, there are many long-standing fishery monitoring projects
5 that have received funding instead of high priority adaptive management monitoring needs.

6 I am not aware of a reliable funding source for the proposed Delta Tunnels AMP having
7 been identified. (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, p. 36.) The proponents are having problems raising all
8 the funds necessary to construct the project, the project is nowhere near final design, and
9 there are as yet many serious unknowns. (See, e.g., SDWA-265, pp. 15–16.) As of the writing
10 of this testimony, a secured funding source to construct the entire project described in the
11 Petition (including the SWP/CVP split described therein) has not been identified in Hearing
12 evidence. (See, e.g., SDWA-265, pp. 15–16, SDWA-315.)

13 The failure of Petitioners to demonstrate sufficient funding is a fatal flaw of the Delta
14 Tunnels AMP. Petitioners have failed to provide evidence that there will be a firm commitment
15 of sufficient resources or staff for adaptive management, and therefore it is reasonable to
16 assume adaptive management will be stymied, as it has been for the TRRP.

17 My experience with the old and new TRRP is that when unforeseen construction,
18 operation or maintenance funding needs arise, the science and restoration funding will be cut
19 to pay for it. The same is likely for the Delta Tunnels. Moreover, without more detail about the
20 Delta Tunnels AMP scope, it will not be possible to demonstrate compliance with the Water
21 Code section 85089 requirement that funding for all mitigation and management be in place
22 prior to construction:

23 Construction of a new Delta conveyance facility shall not be initiated until the
24 persons or entities that contract to receive water from the State Water Project
25 and the federal Central Valley Project or a joint powers authority representing
those entities have made arrangements or entered into contracts to pay for both
of the following:

- 26 (a) The costs of the environmental review, planning, design, construction,
27 mitigation, including mitigation required pursuant to Division 13
28 (commencing with Section 21000 of the Public Resources Code) required

1 but for the construction, operation, and maintenance of any new Delta
water conveyance facility.

2 (b) Full mitigation of property tax or assessments levied by local
3 governments or special districts for land used in the construction,
location, mitigation, or operation of new Delta conveyance facilities.

4 Petitioners' failure to assure complete funding for final design and construction (after
5 more than a decade in pursuit of the Delta Tunnels) supports a finding that they are unlikely to
6 secure adequate, dependable funding for adaptive management, as recommended by the
7 DISB. (SWRCB-51, p. 3.) With significant uncertainty surrounding the Delta Tunnels AMP
8 funding, Petitioners cannot meet their burden, and the State Water Board cannot find, that the
9 CWF will not unreasonably impact fish and wildlife and other public trust resources, or that
10 approval of the project would not be contrary to the public interest.

11 **3. The Governance Structure, Voting Rules and Failure to Protect Against** 12 **Conflicts of Interest Pose Significant Problems**

13 The "Agreement for Implementation of an Adaptive Management Program for Project
14 Operations" ("AMP MOU") is a draft agreement that proposes to have the IICG member
15 agencies operate by consensus, with a lengthy non-binding appeal process through
16 establishment of an appeals panel. (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, MOU p. 10.) Some of the specific
17 problems that undermined the AEAM Program are likely to also undermine the Delta Tunnels
18 AMP:

- 19 • Voting rules for the IICG have been clearly established as consensus.

20 I recommend simple majority voting rules for the IICG with expanded membership.
21 Collaboration through consensus or super-majority is wonderful to strive for, but my
22 experience in the case of the TRRP (TRRP/TMC uses super majority), it is often used to
23 coerce a decision that is to one or more member's advantage by withholding a vote on an
24 issue. To remedy the gridlock, the other members feel compelled to "make a decision" that
25 cannot occur without a super majority vote that includes the holdouts who benefit from the
26 final vote. The Delta Tunnels AMP, using consensus instead of super majority like the TRRP,
27 will find itself in a similar situation because of the consensus requirement and an elaborate
28 non-binding appeals process.

- 1 • The entity that the IICG recommends take a management action can veto a decision of
2 the IICG, regardless of the IICG vote.

3 The TRRP has demonstrated that the system operators will act in their best interests
4 and those of their constituencies, irrespective of the opinions of staff at fish and wildlife
5 agencies. The Delta Tunnels AMP and the AMP MOU clearly state that ultimately, each
6 agency (DWR, USBR, NMFS, USFWS, and CDFW) retains the discretion to make decisions
7 whether to implement the operational decisions and other management actions that the IICG
8 might recommend. (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, p. 10, AMP MOU, p. 10.) With respect to the project
9 operators, DWR and USBR, given the significant investments being made by their customers,
10 there will be significant pressure to act in the best interests of their customers, despite the
11 opinions of the fisheries agencies. Based on my experience with the TRRP, the ability of an
12 agency to overrule a recommendation of the IICG after achieving consensus could risk the
13 loss of trust among committee members.

- 14 • The lack of conflict of interest rules significantly hinders the likelihood of success for
15 the Delta Tunnels AMP.

16 In the case of the TRRP, voting members of the TMC can vote to approve no-bid
17 federal contracts for themselves to design, build and monitor restoration projects. This hinders
18 funding for key adaptive management projects because voting members do not want to see
19 their projects defunded for adaptive management projects. Additionally, proposed adaptive
20 management projects may show that the restoration strategy voting members are
21 implementing (and getting paid to do) is ineffective. In the case of the Delta Tunnels, IICG
22 votes could be steered in the direction of funding the regulatory agencies' historical work such
23 as monitoring adult salmon populations for harvest management purposes in exchange for a
24 favorable vote on operations that might harm protected fish and wildlife resources, or water
25 quality. The Delta Tunnels AMP, as proposed, includes no safeguards to prevent this from
26 happening.

- The governance structure is deficient because the IICG does not include essential stakeholders such as in-Delta agencies, water users, environmentalists, environmental justice groups, recreationalists, fishermen and upstream water users.

In the case of the TRRP, key stakeholders were never given a final vote on anything, only advisory votes. Ultimately, public support for the program decreased significantly. Without meaningful mechanisms for stakeholder input, the Delta Tunnels AMP is unlikely to address issues of concern to the public, including Delta water levels and quality for a variety of beneficial in-Delta uses. The issue of conflict of interest is also exacerbated because Reclamation, DWR and the state and federal water contractors make up the majority of IICG voting members.

The proposed public participation element of the Delta Tunnels AMP is to utilize the existing CSAMP. (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, pp. 65–66.) This is hardly a model for public participation. The CSAMP policy group’s membership is limited to federal and state water management and fisheries agencies, fishing and environmental organizations, and SWP/CVP south-of-Delta water contractors, with only one seat held by in-Delta and upstream water users, respectively. (See LAND-268, slide 25). Many other critically affected interests such as public agencies, upstream water users and Delta agricultural interests would have to be added to the CSAMP policy group in order for it to be truly representative. Also, the CSAMP policy group is similar to the TRRP’s TAMWG in that neither group actually gets a final vote on anything. These groups are merely advisory and offer only the illusion of public involvement.

4. Petitioners’ Proposed Use of Adaptive Management Is Overly Broad and Inappropriate

The DISB, in its report on adaptive management has a seventh recommendation—i.e., *“Recognize where adaptive management is not appropriate.”* (SWRCB-51, p. 4.)

The TRRP had some significant advantages over the Delta Tunnels in terms of adaptive management, yet even it has failed to implement an effective adaptive management program. In particular, Trinity River annual instream flow volumes were fixed by water year.

1 Impacts to landowners along the Trinity River were largely mitigated by funding commitments
2 for new bridges, purchase of homes in the floodplain and replacement or repair of water and
3 sewer systems that would be damaged by higher river flows. Thus, many controversial issues
4 were resolved and not subject to resolution through a consensus-based adaptive
5 management decision-making process.

6 The Delta Tunnels project proposes to use adaptive management to resolve numerous
7 controversial issues. The Delta Tunnels AMP proposes to use adaptive management to revise
8 the CWF's initial spring outflow and fall X2 criteria. (SWRCB-107, Att. 5, pp. 60-64; DWR-
9 1143, p. 6, fn. 39 [adaptive management of spring outflow criteria planned]; see also p. 3, fns.
10 29, 31 [adaptive management of South Delta operational criteria planned].) Changing these
11 parameters outside of the permitting process could also affect other users of water and
12 members of the public who are not part of the AMP process.

13 The Delta Tunnels AMP is also proposed for issues that may not be apparent upon
14 review of a description of the Delta Tunnels AMP and its objectives. For example, the
15 Petitioners propose to use adaptive management to mitigate farmland losses and address
16 water quality impacts. (See, e.g., SWRCB-111, at pp. 2-13 to 2-14 [adaptive management to
17 address water quality effects, including EC and Microcystis]; pp. 2-41, 2-44:26-27 [adaptive
18 management as part of adopted mitigation for impacts to farmlands].) At least with respect to
19 the latter two issues, it appears that the Delta Tunnels AMP is being used to defer the
20 adoption of mitigation for significant unmitigated impacts to loss of farmland and water quality
21 impacts, with the result that significant environmental and financial commitments are
22 undefined and unassured.


23 In short, Petitioners' proposal to use adaptive management in this context is overly
24 broad and inappropriate. When such proposed use is combined with their failure to assure
25 sufficient funding, it is clear that Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the Petition will not
26 unreasonably affect fish and wildlife, or public trust resources, or injure legal users of water, or
27 that it is in the public interest.

1 **E. CONCLUSION**

2 The TRRP was envisioned as a model adaptive management program. It has failed for
 3 a number of reasons. Despite having stable and substantial funding, initial strong public
 4 support, clearly identified blocks of water for fisheries and regulatory flexibility, the TRRP has
 5 not achieved any of its objectives or demonstrated that adaptive management can actually
 6 succeed.

7 The proposed Delta Tunnels adaptive management program is not likely to succeed
 8 and is not even appropriate in some areas the Delta Tunnels proponents propose to apply it,
 9 such as loss of farmland and impacts to water quality, which is clearly a deferral of mitigation.
 10 Important decisions about how much water is dedicated to the environment and how to
 11 mitigate significant environmental impacts should not be put off until a later date under the
 12 guise of adaptive management. The management structure and operating procedures of the
 13 proposed Delta Tunnels AMP make it clear that impasse will be the result of consensus voting
 14 rules. The same agencies that have been in charge of the AEAM Program would also be in
 15 charge of the Delta Tunnels AMP. If history is any indication, the outcome is likely to be a
 16 huge disappointment. Due to its many shortcomings, the Board should not rely on the
 17 proposed Delta Tunnels AMP to find that the Petition is reasonably protective of legal users of
 18 water, fish and wildlife, the public interest, or public trust resources.

19
 20 Executed on the 13th day of July, 2018, at Mount Shasta, California.

21
 22 
 23 _____
 24 Thomas Stokely